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THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF LEGITIMACY:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MEANING
OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
John J. Gibbons*
In the papers collected in this issue, the editors attempt an overview of a collage of problems, issues and tensions which, from various
viewpoints at various times, have been said to reflect the doctrine of
separation of powers. Perhaps, it would be more accurate to refer to
two separate separation of powers doctrines. The compromises reached
by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention in 1787 involved
two significantly distinct aspects. The first aspect, which has produced
by far the greater body of jurisprudence, was the extent to which the
powers of sovereignty in its broadest sense were to be divided between
the states and the national government.' The second consideration was
the manner in which those features of sovereignty ceded to the central
government were to be exercised. The delegates meeting in 1787 were
concerned not only with the delineation of powers to be exercised by
the central government, but with the manner in which the exercise of
those powers would be controlled. As elucidated by Professor Bestor,2
the central government had initially assumed de facto management of
a vast range of powers over foreign affairs and external security before
de jure conferment was made prior to 1787.
The constitution which succeeded the Articles of Confederation
also added vast new substantive powers over domestic affairs. Tension
arising from conflicts between those latter powers and state sovereignty
frequently brought the resulting cases before the Supreme Court.
Indeed, such tension presently continues unabated in the criminal
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
1 That body of jurisprudence includes extensive case law on what Justice Black often
called "Our Federalism." It also includes the congressional debates on nullification,
secession, and on the modifications in that division of sovereignty which resulted from
the Civil War, namely, the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.
2 See Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Original
Intent of the Constitution Historically Examined, 5 SErON HALL L. REv. 527, 563-69 (1974).
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justice field.8 But perhaps more fundamental than the compromises
over state and federal sovereignty were those settlements concerning
the type of central government that should manage foreign affairs,
external security powers and proposed new domestic powers. Those
compromises have also produced tensions. A unique system was devised
for the dispersal of those powers in which no single power could be
fully exercised without the concurrence of at least two branches.
As a description of the actual power relationships, the term "separation of powers" is misleading. A dispersal of decisional responsibility in
the exercise of each power, as distinguished from a separation of powers,
is a more accurate analytical portrayal. No one branch holds ultimate
unfettered decisional responsibility over the exercise of any governmental power. The requirement of concurrence by a second branch,
independent to some degree from the first, was thought to be a reasonable protection against the tyrannical exercise of any power. Inevitably
the system chosen would produce conflicts because only the blandest
exercises of power would be likely to evoke complete concurrence.
However, checks and balances were not designed to produce a frustration of power--only its limitation. Thus Congress could legislate. An
executive ordinarily protected against removal except quadrennially,
could veto legislation, but not finally. Final legislative authority remained the province of Congress, which could override a veto. All
legislation was subject to judicial review where, at least enforcement
by a court was required against the people. But the judicial branch was
left without enforcement power. It depended upon the executive to
implement its judgments. Hence, it was compelled to exercise the selfrestraint that its lack of enforcement power implied.
The following collection of papers analyzes the constitutional
dispersal of decisional responsibility. Current attention has focused
primarily upon the tension between the President and Congress. 4 A
3 Congress recognized the existence of this tension in its statement of Declarations
and Purpose in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, where it is
stated in part:
Congress finds that the high incidence of crime in the United States threatens
the peace, security, and general welfare of the Nation and its citizens. To prevent
crime and to insure the greater safety of the people, law enforcement efforts
must be better coordinated, intensified, and made more effective at all levels of
government.
Congress finds further that crime is essentially a local problem that must be
dealt with by State and local governments if it is to be controlled effectively.
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3701 (1970). See, e.g.,
Caplan, Reflections on the Nationalization of Crime 1964-1968, 3 LAw & Soc. ORDER 583,
593-95 (1973); Liebmann, A Dangerous Explosion, 9 TRIAL, Sept.-Oct. 1973, at 21, 22-23.
4 Justice Goldberg examines an area of potential tension between the Court and
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debate of national dimension has evolved concerning the extent to
which each must share decisional responsibility in matters of domestic
policy. Worried citizens have resorted to the courts in an attempt to
exert pressure in favor of a congressional appropriation rather than a
presidential impoundment. 5 National concern with undeclared wars
has induced interested citizens to avail themselves of the courts to try
to force an unwilling Congress to assume a more active role in foreign
affairs.6 The President has continuously asserted executive prerogatives
of secrecy against both the courts and Congress while Congress has
gravely weighed the ultimate weapon of impeachment. But although
presidential-congressional tension is the chief focus of contemporary
attention, we should not be led to believe that underlying issues are
novel or that such battles have been historically waged exclusively
between the President and Congress.
An illustration of the tension inherent in the system of dispersed
powers arose quite early between the judicial and executive branches.
The federal judges had become a central issue in the presidential election campaign of 1800 because of their enthusiastic enforcement of
the Alien and Sedition Acts, 7 their occasional instruction to a grand
jury founded upon a federal common law of crimes,8 and their allegedly
anti-French enforcement of the neutrality laws.9 The appointment of
sitting judges as Ambassadors ° by Washington and Adams also enCongress. See Goldberg, The Supreme Court, Congress, and Rules of Evidence, 5 SETON
HALL L REV. 667 (1974).
5 For a discussion of this aspect of decisional responsibility, see Rodino, Congressional
Review of Executive Action, 5 SETON HALL L. REv. 489, 512-13 (1974).
6 Id. at 499-502.
7 See 3 A. BEvERImcE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 29-42 (1919) [hereinafter cited as
A. BEVERmDE]. Remarks that could be objectively characterized as imprudent and caustic,
but not necessarily as falsehoods, became the basis for prosecution under a rationale
that "'[i]f a man attempts to destroy the confidence of the people in their officers . . . he
effectually saps the foundation of the government.'" Id. at 34 (part of Justice Chase's
charge to the jury in the trial of newspaper editor Dr; Thomas Cooper). Hence, a popular
attitude evolved that anyone who criticized federal officials became vulnerable. Id. at 41.
See J. GOEBEL, ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 638-51 (1971) (Volume I of the
Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States).
8 J. Go B.L, supra note 7, at 623-33. Some federal courts established a pattern whereby
indictments arose from conduct which solely offended an English common law precedent
or which was deemed "'manifestly subversive of the National Government.'" Hence,
legally permissible behavior was obfuscated and it became conceivable that the political
party in power could employ the judiciary as an instrument of political persecution. See
1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 159, 162-63 (rev. ed. 1937).
9 See 1 C. WARREN, supra note 8, at 158-62.
10 Appointed Ambassador to France by President Adams on February 25, 1799, Chief
Justice Ellsworth was serving in that capacity at the time he resigned from the Court.
Id. at 156, 171-72.
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flamed the controversy. By December 12, 1800, it was clear that Jefferson and his party had dislodged the Federalists from executive office,11
thereby setting the stage for the great struggle between Jefferson and
Marshall over judicial review.
On January 20, 1801, Adams, the lame duck President, submitted
the name of his Secretary of State, John Marshall, to the lame duck
Senate as his second choice for Chief Justice. 12 Marshall was confirmed,
albeit reluctantly, on January 27, 1801.18 He was obnoxious to the new
President both personally 4 and politically. 15 Adding fuel to the fire,
the lame duck Congress, on February 13, 1801, enacted the Circuit Court
Act of 1801.16 Within thirteen days Adams sent to the Senate a com11 Until that date, the outcome of the presidential election had remained in doubt.
Although the Federalists had clearly lost the election, it had not yet been determined that
Jefferson had outpolled Burr in Congress to attain the position of chief executive.
12 1 C. WARRN, supra note 8, at 175. Adams had previously nominated former
Chief Justice John Jay to this post, but Jay declined the reappointment on January 2,
1801. Letter from John Adams to John Jay, Dec. 19, 1800, in 9 WoRx OF JOHN ADAMS
91 (C. Adams ed. 1854); 2 A. BEVERIGE 553 & n.1 (1916).
13 Many Federalists in Congress preferred Judge Paterson to Marshall:
"I think it a pity that the feelings of so honorable and able a Judge should be
wounded, as I have no doubt he will be, by having a younger lawyer, not
more eminent in that line, put over his head."
1 C. WARREN, supra note 8, at 175-76 (quoting from 9 Woam OF JOHN ADAMS 91). However,
it is believed that Judge Paterson was not considered because of his affiliation with the
Hamiltonian faction of the Federalist party. Letter from James Gunn to Alexander Hamilton,
Dec. 18, 1800, in 6 WoRm OF ALExANDER HAMILTON 492 (J. Hamilton ed. 1851); see 1 C.
WARREN, supra note 8, at 175-76.
14 In writing to Madison in 1795, Jefferson observed that Marshall's
lax lounging manners have made him popular with the bulk of the people
of Richmond, & a profound hypocrisy with many thinking men of our country.
But having come forth in the plenitude of his English principles the latter will
see that it is high time to make him known.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Nov. 26, 1795, in 7 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 38 (P. Ford ed. 1896) [hereinafter cited as JEFFERSON].
15 While Congress was deliberating between Burr and Jefferson for the presidency,
Marshall apparently offered a legal opinion that under certain circumstances, Congress
could appoint the President. Inflamed by Federalist support, rumors at the time indicated
that former Chief Justice Jay would thereby have been selected. Additionally, it was
popularly known that Marshall preferred Burr to Jefferson as the new Chief Executive.
I C. WARREN, supra note 8, at 182-83 & n.2.
16 Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 1 et seq., 2 Stat. 89 (repealed 1802). This great statute,
maligned in subsequent years by the Jeffersonians as the "Law of the Midnight Judges,"
has received insufficient attefition from scholars. As is well known, it relieved the Supreme
Court Justices of the onerous burden of sitting at circuit, and granted federal question
jurisdiction to the lower federal courts. It also contained other progressive features
including a provision on the disability of judges. Its most prominent features eventually
found their way into the judicial code-federal question jurisdiction in 1875 and complete
relief from circuit riding duties in 1891. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF
THE SUPREmE COURT 21-30 (1928); H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JuRIsDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW
11-12, 75-76 (1973).
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plete list of the sixteen new judgeships which were subsequently confirmed by March 2, 1801. Moreover, the statute provided that when a
vacancy next occurred in the Supreme Court, the Court would be
reduced from six to five Justices, thereby depriving Jefferson of a
nomination. Furthermore, on February 27, 1801, the lame duck Congress passed the Organic Act of the District of Columbia, 1 which provided for the appointment of justices of the peace for the counties of
Washington and Alexandria. On March 2 Adams nominated and on
March 3 the Senate confirmed the justices of the peace, among them
Mr. Marbury. Their commissions had already been made out by
Marshall, the acting Secretary of State, who continued to function in
that capacity despite having taken the oath of office as Chief Justice on
February 4, 1801.18 The commissions were carried to Adams for signature and returned to the acting Secretary of State who, on March 3,
1801, affixed to them the seal of the United States. By that time it was
approximately 9:00 p.m.,1 9 and Adams' term expired at midnight. The
commissions could not be delivered before then.20 When Jefferson took
the oath of office on March 4, he discovered them, undelivered.
Jefferson's initial reaction was remarkably restrained. He merely
ordered that the commissions be withheld. On March 27, 1801, he
wrote to Henry Knox denouncing all the
17 Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, § 1 et seq., 2 Stat. 103. See note 23 inja.
18 With only four weeks remaining in his administration, Adams wrote to Marshall
that
the circumstances of the times . .. render it necessary that I should request
and authorize you, as I do by this letter, to continue to discharge all the duties
of Secretary of State until ulterior arrangements can be made.
Letter from John Adams to John Marshall, Feb. 4, 1801, in 9 WoaxS OF JoHN AnAS 96-97
(C. Adams ed. 1854). During this period, Marshall was paid only the salary of Chief
Justice, although it has been maintained that he could have drawn dual compensation
for services actually rendered. 2 A. BEvERIME 559 & n.2.
19 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Benjamin Rush, March 24, 1801, in 8
JmFFERsON 32 (P. Ford ed. 1897).
20 Beveridge rejects as "third-hand household gossip" a story, possibly circulated by
Jefferson's great-granddaughter, that incoming Attorney General Levi Lincoln approached
Marshall at midnight carrying Jefferson's watch and expelled him from the office of the
Secretary of State, thereby interrupting Marshall as the latter was still busily engaged in
signing commissions. 2 A. BEvE2uGE 561-62 & 561 n.2.
21 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Knox, March 27, 1801, in 8 JEFFERSON
36-37. Nevertheless, Jefferson was to address a letter to Archibald Stuart 12 days later in
which he evaluated the status of an Adams' appointment for a new western district in
Virginia thusly: "The judge of course stands till the law shall be repealed, which we
trust will be at the next Congress." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Archibald Stuart,
April 8, 1801, in 8 JEFFERSON 46. One can only surmise whether the letter to Knox or the
letter to Stuart expressed his true sentiments. The presidential correspondence does reveal,
however, ample evidence of pressure from Republicans for patronage.
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new appointments which Mr. A crowded in with whip & spur from
the 12th of Dec. when the event of the election was known ...
untill 9. o'clock of the night at 12. o'clock of which he was to go
out of office. This outrage on decency should not have its effect,
except in the life appointments which are irremovable. 21

The last sentence undoubtedly refers to article III, section I of the
Constitution. 22 His initial intention, as expressed to Knox, apparently
was to abide by the Circuit Court Act of 1801. Additionally, Jefferson

acceded to the legitimacy of the Organic Act since he directed the delivery of most of Adams' commissions for justices of the peace.23 Among
those who failed to receive their commissions were Mr. Marbury and
three others,2 4 who thereupon retained Adams' Attorney General,
Charles Lee, to obtain redress.
On December 21, 1801, Lee commenced the most important lawsuit
in the history of the Supreme Court2 5 by moving before the Court for

an order directing Madison, Jefferson's Secretary of State, to show
cause why a mandamus should not issue directing him to deliver the
four commissions. 26 Until that moment, Jefferson had not, at least publicly, departed from his initial decision to abide by the letter of
article III, section 1, thus leaving the new circuit judges in office,
The Constitution provides in relevant part:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold
their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance
in Office.
U.S. CONsT. art. III, § I.23 Of the 42 justices of the peace appointed by Adams for the Washington and
Alexandria counties in the District of Columbia, all but 17 subsequently received their
commissions. 3 A. BEVERIDGE 110. It was Jefferson's contention that Adams' appointees
were simply too numerous. Id. at n.4.
24 The other petitioners were Dennis Ramsay, Robert Townsend Hooe and William
Harper. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 137 (1803).
25 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
26 "'I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our power to
declare an Act of Congress void."' Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function,
69 HARv. L REv. 217, 219 (1955) (quoting from 0. W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LECAL PAPERS 296
(1920)). Possibly so. To Holmes, the old Union soldier, and to his intellectual heir, the
tensions of the state-federal relationship always loomed larger than life.
"I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration
[of unconstitutionality] as to the laws of the several States."
Id. However, had Marshall not established the power of the Court to sanction acts of either
remaining branch in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), it seems unlikely
that a central government of limited powers would have survived for almost two hundred
years.
22
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despite Republican pressure for repeal of the Circuit Court Act. 27 Emanating from the prosecution of Marbury v. Madison,28 an order to show
cause directed to Madison brought an immediate reaction. The mandamus proceeding was regarded as a political maneuver by the Federalists to intimidate Jefferson and those Republicans pressing for
repeal of the Circuit Court Act. 29 It had exactly the opposite effect.
Repeal legislation was introduced in the Senate on January 6, 1802, and
was debated there for the following two months. 80 Throughout the
debate, the order to show cause was objected to on grounds which we
would now refer to as "executive privilege." 81 The bill passed the
Senate on February 3, 1802, and the House on March 3, 1802.2 Once
27 In his initial message to Congress on December 8, 1801, Jefferson devoted a mere
two paragraphs to the state of the judiciary in which he vaguely invited judicial reform:
The judiciary system of the United States, and especially that portion of it
recently erected, will of course present itself to the contemplation of Congress;
and that they may be able to judge of the proportion which the institution bears
to the business it has to perform, I have caused to be procured from the several
States ... an exact statement of all the causes decided since the first establishment
of the courts ....
First Annual Message to the Senate and House of Representatives by President Jefferson,
Dec. 8, 1801, in 8 JEFFERSON 123.
28 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
29 1 C. WARREN, supra note 8, at 204-05.
30 Spearheading the attack on the Circuit Court Act, Senator Breckenridge of Kentucky outlined three basic arguments. First, he contended that it was totally unnecessary
to increase the number of courts when caseloads were steadily diminishing. Should the
future volume of litigation remain constant, he observed, then "the time never will arrive
when America will stand in need of thirty-eight federal judges." 1 ANNALS OF CONg. 26
(1801) [1801-1802]. Secondly, the Senator characterized this Federalist enactment as "a
wanton waste of the public treasure." Id. at 25. Thirdly, he argued that the Founding
Fathers never intended to delegate to federal judges "subjects of litigation which could,
with propriety, be left with the State courts." Id. at 26. In response to the Federalist
contention that by guaranteeing tenure of office to judges of "inferior courts" during
"good behavior," article III of the Constitution preserved such offices once established,
Senator Breckenridge maintained that "[s]inecure offices . . . are not permitted by our
laws or Constitution." Id. at 28.
31 Historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. attributes this expression t6 an official statement made by then Attorney General William P. Rogers in 1958. A presidential right to
preserve the confidentiality of certain information in the public interest had been recognized since Washington's administration, but sporadic exercise of the right in exceptional
circumstances had contributed to its noncontroversial depiction. According to Professor
Schlesinger, the excesses of the McCarthy inquisition inexorably compelled President
Eisenhower in 1954 to redefine this right in terms of "uncontrolled discretion." See
A. SCHLESINcER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 155-59 (1973). Such an interpretation formed the
basis of Attorney General Lincoln's claim on behalf of Jefferson's administration. Attorney
General Rogers may have coined the phrase, but Attorney General Lincoln conceived the
principle.
32 Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 8, 1 1,
2 Stat. 132.
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Jefferson signed the bill on March 8, the sixteen circuit judges nominated by Adams and confirmed by the Senate were unemployed. Since
the Federalist minority in Congress had made clear their belief that
the repeal law was unconstitutional, 83 it seemed virtually certain that
Mr. Lee would soon have sixteen new clients. To forestall that possibility, a bill was introduced abolishing all terms of the Supreme Court
prior to February 1803.84 This action would prevent an original application such as the one made on behalf of the justices of the peace.
The repeal of the Circuit Court Act of 1801 abrogated the federal question jurisdiction which had briefly been conferred upon the lower
federal courts.85 Moreover, it was unlikely that any of the sixteen circuit
judges could have found a defendant in a diversity case against whom
the legality of their dismissal could have been litigated. The Federalist
judges were effectively relegated to inactivity until 1803.
Because Jefferson's party failed to realize a two-thirds majority in
the Senate in the election of 1800, the President probably could not
have succeeded in procuring the removal of these judges. Thus, the
holding action achieved by the postponement of the Court's term until
1803 was of critical importance. Jefferson used the time to good advantage. First, he secured his control over the execution of judgments by
removing Federalist United States Marshals.8" Next, a well orchestrated
public discussion of the desirability of impeaching the members of the
Court was set in motion.87 In the election of 1802, the Republicans won
control of the House of Representatives by a margin of 102 to 39 and of
88 See note 30 supra.
84

Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 1, 2 Stat. 156.

35 The Judiciary Act of 1789 had conferred upon the old circuit courts only diversity

jurisdiction in civil cases. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78. Although
Charles Lee might have attempted to institute a suit in the state courts of Virginia or
Maryland which could thereafter have reached the Supreme Court on a writ of error
(pursuant to section 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act), Lee tried, somewhat ingeniously, to
litigate the case through a jurisdictional attack on the Justices' circuit riding jurisdiction
restored by the 1802 Act. This would have required a holding that the imposition of
circuit riding duties on the Justices in the 1789 Act, which had been removed in 1801
and restored in 1802, was unconstitutional. With Marshal recused because he had heard
the case below, the Court, in Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803), declined Lee's
invitation to dispense with the performance of circuit duties. Had they done otherwise,
the impeachment movement would undoubtedly have accelerated because the Justices
would have been accused of refusing to carry out duties which had been imposed by the
first Congress and acquiesced in for 14 years.
36 Jefferson conveyed to Archibald Stuart his belief that "[t]he only shield for our
Republican citizens against the federalism of the courts is to have the Attornies & Marshals republicans." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Archibald Stuart, supra note 22, at

47.
87 See 1 C. W.aRRE,

supra note 8, at 227-30.
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the Senate by 25 to 9.88 The improvement in Jefferson's political power
in Congress produced a political atmosphere that was highly charged
when the Court convened in Washington for the February term in
1803. Jefferson had the necessary votes to impeach and he promptly took
advantage of his new power in Congress to exert additional pressure on
the Court. On February 4, 1803, he transmitted to the House of Representatives a request for the impeachment of John Pickering, Judge of
the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. 9
The message was clear.
On February 9, 1803, the order to show cause directed to Madison
came on for hearing. Since it was an original proceeding, it required the
taking of testimony. Among the facts which Mr. Lee had to establish
was that commissions had actually been signed and sealed for Marbury
and the other three petitioners. This fact Marshall well knew. Had he
been required to act with the same punctilio that was subsequently
demanded of a Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., for example, 40 he would
have recused himself and testified. He did not. Since Madison did not
38 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES COLONIAL
TIMES TO 1957, at 692 (1960).
89 Since he was a hopelessly insane alcoholic, Jefferson's choice of Pickering as the
first victim was politically astute. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 334-42 (1804) [1803-1804]. Although section 25 of the repealed Circuit Court Act of 1801 had provided a means for
substituting another judge whenever a colleague on the federal bench became unable to
discharge the duties of his office, Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 25, 2 Stat. 97, the Republicans were not interested in so progressive an approach to a still unresolved problem.
Pickering was not impeached on the ground of insanity, but the reality that an insane
person was the first judge impeached may enlighten or obscure consideration of the issue
of possible grounds for impeachment, depending upon the use to which the precedent is
put in seeking a desired result. It should be noted that two Federalist Senators refused to
vote on this question so phrased as to require only an evaluation of the culpability of
Pickering's conduct as a judge. By not imposing an obligation to determine whether
these acts constituted "high crimes and misdemeanors," they warned that "every officer of
the government must be at the mercy of a majority of Congress." In addition, three
Republican Senators withdrew from the chamber rather than actively concur in the
inevitable. See I ANNALS OF CONG. 364-66 (1804) [1803-1804].
40 In 1969, Judge Haynsworth was nominated to the Supreme Court during a period
of great sensitivity to judicial propriety because of certain allegations which had surrounded the resignation of Justice Fortas. During the course of their investigation, the
Senate concluded that Judge Haynsworth should have disqualified himself in a number
of cases where potential conflicts of interest were evident. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v.
Long, 392 F.2d 337 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 966 (1968) (joined in the opinion after
purchasing stock in the victorious party); Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 682
(4th Cir. 1963), vacated and remanded sub nom. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington
Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965) (heard the appeal although appellant had significant commercial ties with a corporation in which he was a part owner and director). See also
Frank, Disqualification of Judges: In Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 LAw & CoN-r.
PROB. 43, 51-57 (1970). His judicial conduct in these instances was a major contributing
factor in the ultimate rejection of his nomination.
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admit the fact, Mr. Lee was forced to resort to a witness. He called
Attorney General Levi Lincoln because it had been established that
whatever commissions were on hand on March 4, 1801 had been delivered to Lincoln. 41 The Attorney General was extremely reluctant
to respond to any examination, but suggested nevertheless that Lee's
questions be reduced to a written form upon which he could determine
propriety. Lincoln's dilemma, as reported by Judge Cranch, illuminates the underlying conflict between the executive and judicial
branches:
On the one hand, he respected the jurisdiction of this court, and on
the other, he felt himself bound to maintain the rights of the executive. He was acting as secretary of state, at the time when this
transaction happened. He was of opinion, and his opinion was supported by that of others whom he highly respected, that he was not
bound, and ought not to answer, as to any facts which 42
came officially to his knowledge while acting as secretary of state.
Lee's questions, having been prepared as Lincoln had requested, elicited from the Attorney General the following reported response:
He repeated the ideas he had before suggested, and said his objections were of two kinds. 1st. He did not think himself bound to disclose his official transactions while acting as secretary of state;
and 2d. He ought not to be compelled
to answer anything which
43
might tend to criminate himself.
Lee acknowledged that Lincoln could assert the privilege against selfincrimination, but objected to the claim of "executive privilege." 44 The
41 In addition to his duties as Attorney General, Lincoln was serving as acting Secretary of State because Madison had delayed his departure from Virginia upon his father's
death. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Secretary of State (James Madison), March 12,
1801, in 8 JEFJFRSON 14; see letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Feb. 1, 1801,
in 7 JEFFEMsoN 485. At the outset of the trial, Lee questioned two State Department clerks
who revealed that subsequent to presidential subscription, the commissions for justices of
the peace had been returned to the office of the Secretary of State for affixture of the
Seal of the United States and recording. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
142-43 (1803).
42 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 145 (1803).
43 Id. at 143-44.
44 See id.at 144. Lee maintained that the duties of the Secretary of State were twofold: as an agent of the President and ministerial. With respect to the former role, no
obligation to reveal information could be required, but in the latter capacity, no such
protection existed. Once civil commissions had been signed by the President, those who
would occupy the offices specified therein would do so not at the will of the President.
The subsequent formalities of recording, affixture of the Seal, and delivery of these documents became obligatory and could not be characterized as anything but ministerial in
nature. See id.at 140-41, 144. In his analysis of this struggle among the branches of government, Charles Warren refers to contemporaneous debates in Congress and newspaper
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Court ruled that the Attorney General was obliged to respond to the
questions posed, but granted his request for a one day postponement of
the proceedings to formulate his answers. The Court reasoned that
[t]here was nothing confidential required to be disclosed. If there
had been, he was not obliged to answer it; and if he thought that
anything was communicated to him in confidence, he was not bound
to disclose it; nor was he obliged to state anything which would
incriminate himself; but that the fact whether such commissions
had been in the office or not, could not be a confidential fact; it is
a fact which all the world have a right to know. If he thought any
of the questions improper, he might state his objections. 45
Lincoln subsequently answered all queries but one; the ultimate disposition of the commissions. He had seen commissions of justices of
the peace when he had entered the office of the Secretary of State that
were both signed by Adams and sealed, but he could not recall whether
the plaintiffs' names had appeared on any of these documents. Thereafter, he had received a list of individuals to be placed into a general
commission which he construed as replacing the aforementioned commissions. These later appointees had been notified, but he had no
knowledge of the fate of plaintiffs' commissions. He did not know
whether Madison had ever obtained them, nor did he know whether
they were in the Secretary of State's office when Madison first occupied
it. The Court then ruled that any handling of plaintiffs' commissions
46
by others was immaterial in this case.
The commissions have never seen the light of day. Perhaps they
were destroyed by Jefferson. 47 Nevertheless, the fact of their existence
accounts to demonstrate the paramount significance of executive privilege as viewed by
the Jefferson administration. 1 C. WARREN, supra note 8, at 232-35.
45 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 144-45.
46 Id. at 145.
47 In his letters, Jefferson displayed a profound belief that his predecessor's conduct
in this matter was so abhorrent that justification for it could not be established by Adams'
closest supporters:
The nominations crowded in by Mr. Adams after he knew he was not appointing
for himself, I treat as mere nullities. His best friends do not disapprove of this.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Findley, March 24, 1801, in 8 JEFFER ON 28.
Nurtured by time, Jefferson's sentiments on the subject of the Midnight Appointments
seem to have smoldered. His comments reflected an ever increasing tendency to view
Adams' action as a personal affront. In writing to Theodore Foster, Jefferson asserted:
"They meant by crippling my rigging to leave me an unwielded hulk, at the mercy of the
elements." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Theodore Foster, May 9, 1801, in 8 JEFFERSON
51. Responding to a letter of condolence from Mrs. John Adams upon the untimely death
of his daughter, Jefferson found occasion to remark:
I can say with truth, that one act of Mr. Adams's life, and one only, ever gave me
a moment's personal displeasure. I did consider his last appointments to office
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was never in dispute and was personally known to Marshall. Madison's
refusal to admit an undisputable fact can only be seen as an effort by
the President to manufacture a claim of executive privilege, thereby
challenging the Court to contend with the necessity for a confrontation.
Marshall circumvented this trap by excusing Lincoln from testifying
about the eventual disposition of the commissions. Had Lincoln testified that he had delivered them to Jefferson, as undoubted he had, the
Court might have been compelled to subpoena the President, who
would certainly have refused to appear. His refusal to appear would
have demonstrated to the Court its dependence upon the executive for
enforcement of its writs and would have brought home rather graphically the need for judicial self-restraint. Fortunately, Lee was able to
find two State Department clerks who, from recollection of conversations and secondary records, 48 were able to establish the existence of
commissions for two of the petitioners. 4 9 Thus passed the first great
imbroglio over executive privilege. There would be another in four
years.50
Marshall had adroitly deprived Jefferson of the opportunity to
as personally unkind. They were from among my most ardent political enemies,
from whom no faithful co-operation could ever be expected; and laid me under
the embarrassment of acting thro' men whose views were to defeat mine, or to
encounter the odium of putting others in their places. It seemed but common
justice to leave a successor free to act by instruments of his own choice.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mrs. John Adams, June 13, 1804, in 8 JEFFERSON 307.
Although he subsequently claimed to have forgiven this "indiscretion," vitriolic statements
were still made when Jefferson ruminated upon his association with Adams:
And then followed those scenes of midnight appointment, which have been condemned by all men. The last day of his political power, the last hours, and even
beyond the midnight, were employed in filling all offices, and especially permanent
ones, with the bitterest federalists, and providing for me the alternative, either to
execute the government by my enemies, whose study it would be to thwart and
defeat all my measures, or to incur the odium of such numerous removals from
office, as might bear me down.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Benjamin Rush, Jan. 16, 1811, in 9 JEF ERsON 297-98
(P. Ford ed. 1898).
48 One clerk had informed Marbury and Ramsay that he had learned of the signing
of two commissions from certain sources who remained, by a Court ruling, unidentified.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 142. The other clerk testified that the names of Marbury and Hooe

had been included in a list generally employed by the clerks to complete such commissions.
Id. at 143; see note 41 supra.
49 Lee also read the affidavit of James Marshall, the Chief Justice's brother, who
claimed to have secured approximately 12 commissions for Alexandria County -because of
fears that "riotous proceedings" would occur there on the night of March 4. Finding the
conveyance of this number of commissions unduly burdensome, Marshall had returned
several to the Secretary of State's office, deleting the appropriate names from a receipt
which he had left. To the best of his recollection, commissions for Hooe and Harper had
been so returned. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 146.
Go See pp. 455-67 infra.
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discipline the Court in the subtleties of separation of powers while the
case was in the testimonial stage. Nevertheless, the warning was clear.
Jefferson was spoiling for a confrontation, and any judicial decree
which required execution by the executive probably would have been
defied. The only remedy for such resistance would have been Jefferson's impeachment. However, the political realities being what they
were, it was more likely that the Court would be impeached. The problem, then, was to find a means of preserving the principle of judicial
review by an independent judiciary, while simultaneously depriving
Jefferson of the opportunity to exercise executive revision.
Marshall wasted no time in devising a solution. Two weeks after the
arguments were concluded, on February 24, 1803, he announced his
most famous decision. 51 To contemporary legal scholars, Marbury v.
Madison is significant because it announced the principle that the
Supreme Court has the power to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional.5 2 Probably in 1801 that principle was not as seriously questioned
as in later times.5 3 Its promulgation, however, was the key to Marshall's
ingenious political solution. What was needed was a result, not requiring an execution, which would permit the Court to chastise the President for his threats against the independence of the judiciary, iterate a
warning to Congress, and rally public support for the Court. Marshall's
solution was to couple his holding that the Supreme Court lacked
original jurisdiction with his chastisement and warning. He opined
upon the impropriety of withholding the commissions 5 4 and advised
that mandamus was a proper remedy in some court. 5 However, he
held that issuance of the writ in an original proceeding was not within
56
the original jurisdiction of the Court.
51 In writing this opinion, Marshall did not have the benefit of the journals and
other writings of members of the Constitutional Convention, for most of these records
were not published until 1819. 1 THE RECORDS OF TIE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at xii
(M. Farrand ed. 1911). Thus he could not rely on much of the material which has been
used so effectively to refute Professor Crosskey's thesis against judicial review. See 2
W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 9761046 (1953). However, Marshall did have the benefit of the debates in Congress in which
the Federalist minority had opposed the repeal of the Circuit Court Act. He also had the
counsel of Justice Paterson, a participant in the Convention and the author of the New
Jersey Plan upon which the basic compromises of the Convention were built. Undoubtedly
the opinion reflects the labor of more than two weeks.
52 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178.
53 See L. BoUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1932); 2 W. CROSsKEY, supra note 51, at

1007.
54 See 5 US. (1 Cranch) at 161-62.
55 See id. at 172-73.
56 See id. at 175-76.
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It is interesting that Marshall could have achieved the result of a
judgment in Madison's favor without asserting the power to declare
statutes unconstitutional. The Court's opinion construed the mandamus clause in the final sentence of section 13 of the Judiciary Act of
17895z as an attempt to confer original jurisdiction upon the Court, and
found it inconsistent with article III, section 2, clause 2.58 A fairer reading is that the entire last sentence of section 13 refers to the Court's
appellate jurisdiction only, whereas the first three sentences refer to
its original jurisdiction. The "persons holding office" language could
well refer to executive department personnel charged with the execution of judgments. Such a reading would give more meaning to section
14, the "all writs" section immediately following.59 Thus Marshall could
have decided in Madison's favor simply as a matter of statutory inter57 Section 13 of the Act provides:
That the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of
a civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a state and its citizens;
and except also between a state and citizens of other states, or aliens, in which
latter case it shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction. And shall have
exclusively all such jurisdiction of suits or proceedings against ambassadors, or
other public ministers, or their domestics, or domestic servants, as a court of law
can have or exercise consistently with the law of nations; and original, but not
exclusive jurisdiction of all suits brought by ambassadors, or other public ministers, or in which a consul, or vice consul, shall be a party. And the trial of issues
in fact in the Supreme Court, in all actions at law against citizens of the United
States, shall be by jury. The Supreme Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction
from the circuit courts and courts of the several states, in the cases herein after
specially provided for; and shall have power to issue writs of prohibition to the
district courts, when proceeding as courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,
and writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to
any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United
States.
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 80.
58 This clause of the Constitution provides in pertinent part:
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions,
and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
59 Section 14 of the Act states:
That all the before-mentioned courts of the United States, shall have power to
issue writs of scire Jacias, habeas corpus, and'all other writs not specially provided
for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law. And that either of
the justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts, shall
have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into
the cause of commitment.-Provided, That writs of habeas corpus shall in no case

extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody, under or by colour
of the authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court
of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify.
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81.
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pretation. However, that method would have afforded neither the
opportunity for a warning to the Republican Congress that the Court
was looking over its shoulder, nor the prospect of encouraging its
own political constituency. Marshall was determined to advise both
the executive and the legislature that the three branches were interdependent. A constitutional rather than a statutory interpretation was
better suited to that purpose. A measure of the tour de force he accomplished in selecting a constitutional interpretation can be fully appreciated when one realizes that Justice Paterson, a delegate to the Constitutional Convention and a member of the Senate committee which
had drafted the Judiciary Act of 1789,60 concurred in the opinion. The
best evidence that Marshall achieved his political purpose may be the
fact that eventually, despite the wrath of the Jeffersonians, only one
Justice, Samuel Chase, was impeached and he Was acquitted.
On March 12, 1804, the Senate, in one of its more inglorious
moments, convicted the insane Judge Pickering, in absentia, by a
partisan vote of nineteen to seven."' Republican party discipline in the
Senate having proved reliable, the House voted to impeach Justice
Samuel Chase, within one hour of the Senate vote on Pickering. 2 The
plan to make Chase the next victim had been in the works for a long
time.63 But with the election of 1804 on the horizon, Jefferson decided
it would be impolitic to champion again the attack on the Court.
FEnERAL CONGRESS 1789-1791, at 11 (1972).
61 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 367 (1804) [1803-1804]. Jefferson's congressional managers ruthlessly insisted upon vindicating his recommendation, made a few days before the commencement of the arguments in Marbusy v. Madison, that Pickering be convicted. See
note 39 supra.
60 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FImr

62 3 A.

BEVERIDGE 169.

63 The Republican managers focused their attention upon Justice Chase months
prior to the presentation of articles of impeachment to the House. Public opinion was
effectively influenced by a collection of unflattering statements published in pamphlet
form and distributed nationally. The Justice had thus been tried and convicted in the
minds of the populace before proceedings had been instituted in Washington. Id. at 171.
The impeachment of Justice Chase was a preliminary manifestation of a greater
Republican scheme to remove those judges who would use their office to frustrate the
aspirations of the dominant political party. Supporters of this viewpoint maintained that
an independent judiciary which could declare acts of Congress unconstitutional and issue
writs of mandamus to high officials of the executive branch represented too divisive a
force within the governmental structure. These Republicans, led by Senator William
Branch Giles of Virginia, predicted that all Supreme Court Justices except William
Johnson of South Carolina, a Jefferson appointee, would eventually suffer the same fate
as Justice Chase. Id. at 157-59 & n.4. Their campaign led John Quincy Adams to conclude
that the Republicans wished to "have swept the supreme judicial bench clean at a stroke."
Letter from John Quincy Adams to John Adams, March 8, 1805, in 3 WRITINGS OF JOHN
QUINCY ADAMS 108 (W. Ford ed. 1914).
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Instead he wrote to Congressman Joseph H. Nicholson on May 13,
1803, asking that Nicholson take the lead in the matter." Chase's trial
did not begin until February 4, 1805. Aaron Burr, under indictment
for Alexander Hamilton's murder in two states, 65 presided in what was
to be his last public service. None of the eight articles of impeachment
drawn by the House came close to charging a crime.66 The House
64 Jefferson wrote:

You must have heard of the extraordinary charge of Chace [sic] to the Grand
Jury at Baltimore. Ought this seditious and official attack on the principles of
our Constitution, and on the proceedings of a State, to go unpunished? and to
whom so pointedly as yourself will the public look for the necessary measures?
I ask these questions for your consideration, for myself it is better that I should
not interfere.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Nicholson, May 13, 1803, in 10 JEFFERSON 390
(library ed. 1904). In this correspondence, Jefferson was alluding to comments made by
Justice Chase in his charge to the grand jury, wherein he viciously attacked the activities
and goals of the Republicans. Chase claimed, among other things, that universal suffrage
would destroy "'all security for property and personal liberty . . . and our republican
constitution [would] sink into a mobocracy, the worst of all popular governments."' 3
A. BEvItuE 169.
65 Murder indictments in New Jersey and New York resulted from the duel in which
Hamilton was slain. 1 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 314-15 (C. Adams ed. 1874); see
note 82 infra.
66 Professor Raoul Berger defends the Chase impeachment for actions that he characterizes as an "oppressive misuse of power." See R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUToNAL PROBLEMS 224-51 (1973). His defense, however, appears to rest not on the
Justice's judicial conduct exclusively, but more on the unconstitutionality of the Sedition
Act which was rejected by the electorate in the election of 1800 and expired by its terms
in 1801. However he does focus upon United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239 (No.
14,709) (C.C.D. Va. 1800), as an instance of judicial misconduct worthy of impeachment.

See R.

BERGER,

supra at 230-51.

Berger's treatment of Callender, in which the named defendant was indicted for a
seditious libel against President Adams, should be compared with the official report of
the case and Professor Goebel's treatment of it. J. GoEBEL, supra note 7, at 640-46, 648-51.
Five of the eight articles of impeachment were based upon Callender. The second article
alleged misconduct in overruling the objection of John Basset as a juror. 2 ANNALS OF
CONG. 86 (1804) [1804-1805]. See R. BERGER, supra at 238; but see United States v. Callender,
supra at 260 n.2, wherein Basset is said to have informed the court that he had seen extracts of defendant's book republished in the newspapers, but did not know whether they
had been accurately copied or were contextually precise. Basset did reveal to the court,
however, that if the extracts were accurate and their logical meaning not adequately
explained, he had arrived at the conclusion that Callender had violated the sedition law.
The third article alleged misconduct in refusing to permit John Taylor to testify for the
defense. Justice Chase ruled that testimony proffered to respond only partially to a
charge was inadmissible. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 86 (1804) [1804-1805]. See United States v.
Callender, supra at 251; R. BERGER, supra at 236. But see J. GOEBEL, supra note 7, at 644-45,
where it is suggested that had criminal cases been appealable at that time, this ruling
would not have been reversible error. The fourth article alleged rude, contemptuous and
indecent conduct during the trial. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 86 (1804) [1804-1805]. See R. BERGER,
supra at 243-48; but see United States v. Callender, supra at 243-44, 248, 251-54, wherein
Justice Chase and defendant's attorneys engaged in frequent but sincere and respectful
arguments concerning the law applicable to this controversy.
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managers of the impeachment proceeding contended that Chase could
be removed from office if two-thirds of the Senate agreed with a majority of the House in condemnation of the manner in which he had
fulfilled his judicial office. 67 His attorneys contended that Chase could
be impeached only for an indictable offense. 68 That issue remains unresolved to this day. When the vote on Chase's impeachment took place
on March 1, 1805, it was clear that Jefferson had not only been overwhelmingly reelected, but that he had carried into office more Republican Congressmen and Senators than in the election of 1802. Despite
The chief source of tension between the court and counsel throughout the trial was
the defense contention that the constitutionality of the Sedition Act was a matter to be
determined solely by the jury. Professor Berger's description of Chase's trial conduct is
hardly objective because it completely ignores this source of the evident tension. As
Professor Goebel explains:
We come at length to the crucial gambit of the defense in the Callender
case-the attack on the constitutionality of the Sedition Act and the bold but
fruitless attempt to have this issue treated as one for the jury alone to determine.
This was not an ingenious concoction of counsel. It had, so to speak, a pre-history
which should be looked into before relating the climactic moments at Richmond.
From the first the Jeffersonian Republicans had claimed that the statute was unconstitutional, a contention based upon their doctrine of strict construction of
the Constitution. Collateral was the proposition that the issue of constitutionality
was a matter for the jury. The attempt to throw into the hands of the jury a
function which the Circuit judges had already been exercising was a direct
challenge to the long-seated assumption that this was an incident of judicial
power. It may properly be taken as a preliminary to the assault on the judiciary
that was to follow.
J. GOEBEL, supra note 7, at 645. Article five accused Chase of misconduct in issuing a
bench warrant instead of a summons. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 86-87 (1804) [1804-1805]. The
Senate vote was unanimous for Chase on this count. Id. at 667 (1805). Berger does not
rely on this count, In article six, Chase was accused of misconduct in refusing a continuance so that out-of-state witnesses could be brought to testify. R. BERGFit, supra
at 236 n.56. But see United States v. Callender, supra, wherein Justice Chase commented
with respect to William Giles:
It appeared, that he was within a little distance of this place, and the cause was
suspended till Monday, that Mr. Giles might be summoned, before that day, to
attend. On Monday, you asked for a postponement of the trial for a few hours,
and it was stated that, perhaps he might come in the course of the day. Instead
of a few hours, you had choice of continuing it till to-day. Mr. Giles has been
summoned, and does not attend. . . . There is no reason to believe he will be
here during the term of the court: you do not expect him; if such excuses as these
authorize a postponement of the trial, it must be evident that this cause will never
be tried.
Id. at 243. The ruling on the request for a continuance seems, under the circumstances,
an entirely legitimate exercise of discretion.
To the five charges emanating from Callender that were actually filed, Berger adds
a sixth which was never made by the House of Representatives: "CHASE HAD PREJUDGED THE CASE BEFORE TRIAL AND DETERMINED TO CONVICT." R. BERGFR,
supra at 230. In making his case that Justice Chase was a "hangman," while completely
ignoring the direct relationship between the impeachment and the Republican attack
upon the article III judiciary, Professor Berger's discussion is unrealistic and unfair.
87 See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 163-65, 327-28, 643-44 (1805) [1804-1805].
6s Id. at 237, 357.

452

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:435

this overwhelming mandate from the people, six Republican Senators,
including one who had abstained from voting in the Pickering trial,
broke party discipline.69 Jefferson failed to muster a two-thirds majority
of the Senate, and lost the chance to cleanse the Court of Federalists.
In turn, he also lost an opportunity to replace John Marshall with
Spencer Roane.70 Six Senators of his own party had deprived his attack
upon the Court of its legitimacy.
Jefferson's political error in the Chase impeachment resulted from
his lack of appreciation for the profound significance of the dispersal of
decisional responsibility that represented the essential feature of the
1787 Constitution. He was the most popular figure of the first decade
of the nineteenth century. He was also the most effective party organizer of that time or, perhaps, of all time3' But he failed to appreciate
69 Republican Senators Samuel Mitchell and John Smith of New York, John Smith of
Ohio, and John Gaillard of South Carolina joined Vermont Senators Israel Smith and
Stephen Bradley (who had abstained in the Pickering vote) in voting not guilty on every
article of impeachment. See id. at 665-69.
70 By common repute Roane was Jefferson's choice for Chief Justice. 3 A. BEvEaDGE
113. The difference in the kind of government which would have evolved had Jefferson
been able to remove Marshall from the Court and replace him with Roane is a matter of
speculation. However, some insight might be gained from Roane's defiance of the Supreme
Court's mandate in Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813).
As President of the Court of Appeals of Virginia, his resistance produced Justice Story's
opinion in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), which rejected
Roane's contention that section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (which gave the Supreme
Court jurisdiction to review decisions of the highest court of a state on writ of error) was
unconstitutional. Beveridge suggests that Roane was speaking on behalf of the entire
Republican political organization of Virginia which included, naturally, Jefferson and
Madison. See 4 A. BEVEiuDGE 158-60 (1919). Jefferson did in fact applaud Roane's position
on this issue. See letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane, Oct. 12, 1815, in 9
JEFFERsoN 531-32. Story refrained from deciding whether the Court would issue a mandamus to compel obedience to its mandate by the Virginia courts once the controversy
concerning the constitutionality of its jurisdiction had been settled. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at
362. Though he did not participate in the Court's initial rejection of Virginia's nullification of the supremacy clause because of his brother's interest in the controversy, Marshall
had several other occasions to speak to the Court's authority to enforce the supremacy of
the national law, culminating in his great pronouncement on that subject in Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
71 Although part of his election platform advocated the abolishment of political
parties, he obviously was referring to the Federalist party and not his own. Jefferson
maintained that the ideals espoused by the Federalist party contradicted the principles
of the Constitution, whereas the Republicans represented
[the true theory of our constitution . . . that the states are independent as to
everything within themselves, & united as to everything respecting foreign nations.
Let the general government be reduced to foreign concerns only, and let our
affairs be disentangled from those of all other nations, except as to commerce,
which the merchants will manage the better, the more they are left free to manage for themselves, and our general government may be reduced to a very simple
organization, & a very unexpensive [sic] one; a few plain duties to be performed
by a few servants.
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what Marshall tried to tell him in Marbury v. Madison. No branch of
the national government, no matter how great its constituency, could
ever achieve total power over anything, including the removal of judges.
This was not a parliamentary system in which "the government" (the
executive) had its way or vacated its position for another government.
Here, irrespective of the magnitude of "the government's" popular
mandate, it shared decisional responsibility throughout its quadrennial
term with the House of Representatives, a Senate (one-third of whose
members did not have to face the electorate during "the government's"
term), and a Court that could be removed only with concurrence by
two-thirds of the Senate. Jefferson had lost sight of the principles of
divided decisional responsibility and interdependence in the exercise
of power-the two components of the true meaning of the separation
of powers concept. It mattered little whether the six defecting Republican Senators either agreed with Chase's lawyers that impeachment was
limited to indictable offenses, or voted only from revulsion with Jefferson's naked assertions of power, or were motivated by guilt arising from
their recent in absentia trial of the insane Pickering. The salient point
to be observed is that a popular mandate to the executive did not
confer upon Jefferson any power to diminish the constitutionallyimposed decisional responsibilities of the other branches of the national
government. This is a government of internally self-limiting powers.
In Chase's impeachment trial one of these internal self-limitations performed exactly as it was intended to perform.
Before Jefferson left office he was to encounter another internal
limitation upon the powers of the national government. Presiding at
Chase's trial in the Senate in 1805, Aaron Burr had displayed the same
integrity which had led him to decline a Federalist deal for the Presidency in January of 1801.72 Burr insisted as presiding officer that Chase
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gideon Granger, Aug. 13, 1800, in 7 JEFFERSON 451-52.
Obviously, such a governmental scheme would remove the necessity for sophisticated
political party machinery at the federal level.
The Federalists were never able to rebound from their loss in the election of 1800.
Republican dominancy became so thorough that it fostered the party's own vanquishment. Unable to find political expression in an essentially one-party system, different
sectional and economic interests forged two distinct political persuasions after the election of 1824.
72 Beveridge asserts that Burr would undoubtedly have become the third President of
the United States had he not remained steadfastly loyal to his party and the principles it
espoused. See 2 A. BEvERI GE 545 nn.l & 2, 546 n.l.
Both Jefferson and Burr had received. seventy-three electoral votes. Pursuant to constitutional guidelines, the ultimate decision was consequently to be made by the members
of the House of Representatives. Between the two Republicans, Burr appeared more
attractive to the Federalists. Moreover, the Federalists had an alternate course of action.
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be afforded at least a modicum of a fair trial" despite Jefferson's not
too subtle efforts to corrupt him with patronage for his relatives, 74
political influence in his behalf in the Hamilton murder indictment
7
and social favor. 76 Chase was acquitted on March 1, 1805.
Having been replaced as Vice President by George Clinton, Aaron
Burr took leave of the Senate and of public life on March 2, 1805.78
Burr had been partly responsible for Jefferson's first term by carrying
New York for the Republicans and by resisting the blandishments of
the Federalists when the House of Representatives hung in the balance.79 His service in the Republican cause had been exemplary.8 0 But
Jefferson, like many others who aspire to exercise personal power, was
insecure in the face of someone who might, by the force of personality,
become a competing pole. Hence, Jefferson had decreed that George
Clinton replace Burr as the Republican vice presidential candidate in
1804.81 Seeking to retain some constituency, Burr became a candidate
for Governor of New York. However, Hamilton's unremitting animosity for Burr led to the duel in which Hamilton died and Burr's
political career ended.82 Leaving the Vice Presidency, .he could not reIt was Jefferson's fear that the Federalists would frustrate attempts to break the deadlock
in the House in order to secure the Presidency for a member of their party. See letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Aaron Burr, Dec. 15, 1800, in 7 JEFFERSON 467. After his election, however, a more confident Jefferson maintained that the Federalists failed to implement their scheme because of apprehension "that a legislative usurpation would be
resisted by arms, and a recourse to a convention to re-organize and amend the government." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Feb. 18, 1801, in 7 JEFFERSON 494.
78 3 A. BEvEmiDGE 183.
74 While the'impeachment trial was pending, Jefferson appointed Burr's brother-inlaw, stepson, and his closest friend to important offices in the new government of the
Louisiana Territory. Id. at 182.
75 A petition requesting the cessation of prosecution was signed by almost all Republican Senators and forwarded to the Governor of New Jersey. See 1 MEmsOR OF JOHN
QUINcy ADAMS 317-18 (C. Adams ed. 1874).
76 Burr suddenly found himself frequently invited to dine with the President at the
Executive Mansion. 3 A. BEVER GE 182.
77 See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
78 See 1 MEMOIRs OF JOHN QuINcY ADAMS 365, 367 (C. Adams ed. 1874).
79 See note 72 supra.
80 His one fall from Republican grace was on January 27, 1802 when his tie-breaking
vote as the presiding officer carried a motion to refer the proposed repeal of the Circuit
Court Act of 1801 to a special committee for study. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 147, 150 (1802)
[1801-1802]. However, Beveridge notes that only Burr's political enemies criticized this
action. Those Republicans who were not personally hostile to him applauded Burr's
impartiality as a favorable reflection upon the party. 3 A. BEvERI E 67-68 & 68 n.l.
81 Also from New York, Clinton was Burr's bitterest enemy. This political decision
made it almost inevitable that Jefferson would try to destroy Burr's political reputation.
3 A. BEVERIDGE 280.
82 The personal rivalry between Hamilton and Burr commenced as practicing attor.
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turn to the practice of law in New York because of the outstanding
murder indictments in both New York and New Jersey. Consequently,
he went west where he was enthusiastically received by leading frontier
politicians.88
This is not the proper occasion to determine the truth concerning
Burr's ultimate intentions s4 It suffices to observe that by the summer
of 1806, western and southern enthusiasm for Burr's proposed Mexican
adventure"5 interfered with Jefferson's virtuoso but solo handling of
foreign affairs and external security. 6 In November 1806, the President
concluded that Burr and his project must be destroyed.8 7 However,
the detested federal judiciary had to be the vehicle of destruction if
the elimination of Burr was to have any claim of legitimacy. In this
enterprise, Jefferson learned his second great lesson about the interdependence of power relationships in the American constitutional
framework.
The start of the proceedings was hardly propitious, considering the
necessity to enlist the aid of the judiciary in Burr's destruction. The
President's agent in New Orleans, General James Wilkinson,8 8 arrested
neys of the New York Bar where only Burr's ability was said to equal that of Hamilton.
However, the latter's hostility to Burr was not publicly exposed until Burr defeated
Hamilton's father-in-law, Philip Schuyler, for the United States Senate. From that point
forward, Hamilton succeeded at various times in frustrating Burr's political advancement.
Beveridge views Hamilton as being directly responsible in denying Burr such positions as
Vice President, Senator, Ambassador to France, Governor of New York, and brigadier
general in an army raised for an anticipated conflict with France in 1798. It was in
response to another attack in the New York gubernatorial campaign of 1804 that the duel
occurred. Id. at 277 n.l.
88 One of Burr's most gracious hosts was Andrew Jackson. The Tennessee Republican
had first formed an amiable relationship with Burr nine years earlier when Burr had
supported Jackson's attempts to win statehood for this territory.
The enthusiasm with which Burr had been welcomed was due in part to the reports
of Burr's impartiality during the Chase impeachment trial and his stirring farewell
speech to the Senate. Additionally, the duel which climaxed Burr's downfall in the East
was hailed by the frontiersmen of the West and South who still viewed such challenges
as a matter of honor. Id. at 292-93.
84 See 3 H. ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 219-44 (1921); W.
McCALEB, AARON BuP. CONsPIRAcY 25-92 (1936).
85 Burr advocated the invasion of Mexico as a step toward continuing expansion. By
1806, the perimeters of frontier settlements had experienced sufficient contact with agents
of the Spanish Government to form an intense hatred for this foreign autocracy. Hence,
Burr's scheme was overwhelmingly well received by those in whose states and territories he
now traveled.
86 Schlesinger suggests that Jefferson did not exclusively handle foreign affairs and
external security, but had the concurrence of Congress. See A. SCHLESINGFR, supra note 31,
at 23.
87 Proclamation Against Burr's Plot, Nov. 27, 1806, in 8 JEFFERSON 481-82.
88 Coincidentally, Wilkinson was also serving the King of Spain at the time. "Wilkin-
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Burr's associates, Dr. Justus Bollman and Samuel Swartwout, without warrants and confined them in a warship. When the territorial
court issued a writ of habeas corpus he defied it.89 Thereafter Congress
demanded an explanation," and Jefferson defended such defiance as
necessary.9' When the ship carrying Bollman and Swartwout arrived at
Baltimore, they were transported to Washington and locked up in the
son is entirely devoted to us. He enjoys a considerable pension from the King." Letter
from The Marquis of Casa Yrujo (Spanish Minister) to Don Pedro Cevallos, Jan. 28, 1807,
in 3 H. ADAMS, supra note 84, at 342; see also W. McCALEB, supra note 84, at 166-71.
89 Wilkinson proclaimed that his duty was
"to secure the nation which is menaced to its foundations by a band of traitors
associated with Aaron Burr.... [and to] arrest, without respect to class or station,
all those against whom [he had] positive proof of being accomplices in the
machinations against the state."
3 A. BEVERIgE 334 (quoting from W. McCALEB, supra note 84, at 217).
90 After the Proclamation Against Burr's Plot (see note 87 supra), Jefferson delivered,
on December 2, 1806, his Sixth Annual Message (8 JEFFERSON 482-95) in which he made
the following statement:
Having received information that in another part of the United States a great
number of private individuals were combining together, arming and organizing
themselves contrary to law, to carry on military expeditions against the territories
of Spain, I thought it necessary, by proclamations as well as by special orders, to
take measures for preventing and suppressing this enterprise, for seizing the
vessels, arms, and other means provided for it, and for arresting and bringing
to justice its authors and abettors.
Id. at 489 (emphasis added). Neither Jefferson's Proclamation nor his Sixth Message
cited Burr by name as guilty of treason. Indeed, only vague references were made to a
militaristic conspiracy whose objectives were Spanish territorial possessions. Because of the
widespread political hostility against Spain, it was assumed that Burr must have been
suspected of some heinous crime to warrant such continuous presidential attention.
Prompted by a speech by John Randolph (2 ANNALS OF CONG. 334-36 (1807) [1806-1807]),
an impatient Congress demanded from Jefferson specific information concerning the nature
of the "conspiracy" and measures taken to suppress it. Id. at 345, 357-58. The mood of
Congress was reflected in remarks by George Campbell of Tennessee: "[T]his conspiracy
has been painted in stronger colors than there is reason to think it deserves." He characterized the only evidence heretofore proffered as "newspaper evidence." Id. at 347.
91 On January 22, 1807, Jefferson sent to Congress a detailed account of Burr's
activities which was derived from sources that were admittedly suspect yet "clearly" established Burr's guilt:
It is chiefly in the form of letters, often containing such amixture of rumors, conjectures, and suspicions, as renders it difficult to sift out the real facts, and unadvisable to hazard more than general outlines, strengthened by current information,
on the particular credibility of the relator. In this state of the evidence . . .
neither safety nor justice will permit the exposing names, except that of the
principal actor, whose guilt is placed beyond question.
2 ANNALS OF CONG. 39-40 (1807) [1806-1807]. In his message, Jefferson subsequently explained that Wilkinson's conduct was "probably" motivated by a belief that New Orleans
could provide neither an impartial trial nor a safe area of confinement. Id. at 43. It is
also of some import that Jefferson ordered an agent concealed in these western territories, but the informant most frequently referred to in the presidential message was
General Wilkinson. See id. at 40, 43.
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marine barracks. An application was made to William Cranch, Chief
Judge of the circuit court in the District of Columbia, for a writ of
habeas corpus. With Jefferson participating directly in the preparation
of the government's case, 92 the three-judge court held, two to one, that
Bollman and Swartwout should be held withont bail while awaiting
their trial for treason against the United States. 93 This decision represents the first time that a national tribunal split on political grounds94
In Ex parte Bollman,9 5 counsel for the named litigant and Swartwout
immediately applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus
and certiorari. 98
The administration's strategy now became clear. In the circuit
court in the District of Columbia, Jefferson had a "safe" Republican
majority which would accept his version of the law of treason. 97 In that
vicinage, potential petit jurors had already been subjected to an enormous barrage of adverse pre-trial publicity by the administration. Moreover, these citizens would primarily be government employees
dependent upon the patronage of the executive branch. If Burr could
be tried in Washington the outcome was a forgone conclusion. And
since the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not provide for appeals from convictions in federal criminal cases,98 the expected death sentence could be
promptly executed without any trouble from the Federalist judges on
the Supreme Court. When Marshall signed an order directing the
United States Marshal to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should
not issue, the administration sensed trouble.
In his message to Congress on January 22, 1807, Jefferson had
92 Because Jefferson questioned the sufficiency of Wilkinson's affidavit, he secured
additional documentation to strengthen the government's case. 3 A. BEvERIGE 344-45.
93 1 C. WARREN, supra note 8, at 303. The judicial proceedings evoked such excitement
that the Senate had difficulty forming a quorum an~l the House was forced to adjourn for
want of a quorum. Letter from John Q. Adams to John Adams, Jan. 30, 1807, in 3
WRrTINGS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 159 (W. Ford ed. 1914).
94 3 A. BhvERH)GE 346. Appointed originally by President Adams and reappointed by
Jefferson, the Federalist Chief Judge was outvoted by Jefferson's Republican appointees,
Nicholas Fitzhugh and Allen Bowie Duckett. Id. at 346 & nn.2 & 3.
95 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
96 Id. at 75.
97 Jefferson was intent upon selecting a single forum to hear and decide all the
issues of this controversy:
It is necessary that all important testimony should be brought to one centre, in
order that the guilty may be convicted, and the innocent left untroubled.
etter from Thomas Jefferson to General James Wilkinson, Jan. 3, 1807, in 11 JEFFERSON
130 (library ed. 1904).
98 Until -1889, federal criminal convictions were appealable to the Supreme Court
only upon a division of opinion on a question of law. Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 6,
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assured Congress that Burr was guilty of treason "beyond question." 99

He had outlined therein the evidence which he considered supportive
of that conclusion. The affidavits which he caused to be presented in
opposition to the bail application for Bollman and Swartwout contained essentiallythe same evidence. 100 Thus, if the Supreme Court
could pass upon the sufficiency of those affidavits in reviewing the decision of his Republican appointees, it could, even before Burr's apprehension, define treason quite differently than Jefferson had in mind.
Moreover, the Court could pass upon the legality of trying the defendants in the District of Columbia for offenses committed, if at all, a
thousand miles from there.
Remembering its success in holding the operation of the federal
judiciary in abeyance by abolishing the Supreme Court's term for
fourteen months, 101 the administration now formulated an even bolder
maneuver. On January 23, 1807, Jefferson's personal representative in
the Senate, Senator Giles, introduced a bill (which was promptly passed
under suspension of the rules) suspending in certain cases the writ of
habeas corpus for three months.10 2 The Senate also adopted a special
message to the House asking that the bill be considered in secret and
passed promptly. 03 But as in the matter of Chase's impeachment,
Jefferson once again miscalculated the extent to which party discipline
could be imposed. The House rebelled. This time the effort to deprive
the Supreme Court of jurisdiction failed overwhelmingly. 10 4 Although
2 Stat. 159. By a writ of error, convictions for capital crimes then became appealable.
Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, § 6, 25 Stat. 656.
09 See note 91 supra.
100 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 76 & n.(a) (editorial footnote to affidavits filed in the circuit
court which refers the reader to an appendix (id. at 455-69) that contains the documents
distributed to Congress as part of the presidential message of January 22, 1807).
101 See note 34,supra and accompanying text.
102 The usually laborious enactment process was completed in the Senate on the same
day that the bill had first been introduced. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 44 (1807) [1806-1807].
103 The Senate communication stated in pertinent part:
The Senate have passed a bill suspending for three months the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, in certain cases, which they think expedient to comcunicate to you in confidence, and to request your concurrence therein, as
speedily as the emergency of the case shall, in your judgment, require.
ld;
104 The Senate bill was defeated by a vote of 113 to 19. Id. at 423. Among those
Senators who voiced an opinion, the remarks of John Eppes of Virginia were representative of the majority:
I cannot, however bring myself to believe that this country is placed in such a
dreadful situation as to authorize me to suspend the personal rights of the citizen,
and to give him, in lieu of a free Constitution, the Executive will for his charter.
I consider the provision in the Constitution for suspending the habeas corpus as
designed only for occasions of great national danger.
Id. at 411.
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the executive had the physical power to make illegal arrests and transport prisoners thousands of miles in defiance of a powerless judiciary,
it could not convince a majority of the House of Representatives to
become a party to that naked exercise of illegal power. The attempt to
deprive the Court of an opportunity to consider the legitimacy of the
President's exercise of power failed.
For Bollman and Swartwout a formidable jurisdictional hurdle
still remained. Marbury v. Madison had held that the Supreme Court
could not exercise original jurisdiction other than that specified in
article III, section 2 of the Constitution. The Judiciary Act of 1789
did not provide for appeals in federal criminal cases. How, then, could
the Supreme Court issue a writ of habeas corpus within its appellate
jurisdiction? Oddly enough, Jefferson's Attorney General, Caesar A.
Rodney, declined to argue the jurisdictional point'0 5 although it was
to be raised by the Court. 10 6 Rodney's unwillingness probably reflected
105 See 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 79.

106 Id. at 93-94. The Court first addressed itself to possible limitations imposed upon
courts by section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 through which a substantive grant of
this power had initially been made. Because this statute contained restrictive language
("which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions'), the Court
believed it incumbent to decide which of the two antecedents ("writs of scire facias [and]
habeas corpus" [or] "all other writs") became subsequently modified. Should the restriction apply to both antecedents, writs of habeas corpus could issue only from those courts
that could ultimately decide the controversy. Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall alluded to the only two dire circumstances under which the Constitution permitted
suspension of the Great Writ as an indication of the imperativeness that efficient means
be furnished to insure the writ's efficacious operation. In this respect, he commented that
"if the means be not in existence, the privilege itself would be lost, although no law for
its suspension should be enacted." Hence, all the courts possessed the power to issue such
writs. Id. at 95. To further support its holding, the Court then turned to section 33 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 which provided that bail be admitted to all those arrested for
non-capital crimes; but for capital crimes, only a Justice of the Supreme Court or a
judge of a district court could set the offender free on bail. In the latter instance, a court
which did not commit the prisoner would still have the power to bail him by bringing
the prisoner before it through the issuance of the same writ applied for in this case. Id.
at 99-100.
The Court then evaluated the compatability of this act of Congress with
the Constitution. Having already demonstrated its attitude toward enactments which
augmented its original jurisdiction as enumerated in the Constitution (Marbusy v.
Madison), it was forced to base its argument upon its appellate jurisdiction if it sought to
preserve the validity of such legislation. Appellate jurisdiction was established by viewing judicial action through which an individual is imprisoned (to be distinguished from
the establishment of the citizen's innocence or guilt) as a reviewable decision of an inferior court. Id. at 100-01.
Marshall's Boliman opinion has been criticized for the haste with which it was constructed and for the dictum that article I, section 9, clause 2 of the Constitution was not
a self-executing grant of habeas corpus jurisdiction. Paschal, The Constitution and
Habeas Corpus, 1970 DuKiE LJ. 605. Professor Paschal's first criticism disregards the
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a deliberate decision by Jefferson not to acknowledge the power of the
Court to exercise judicial review over the constitutionality of federal
10 7
statutes by relying upon the precedent of Marbury v. Madison.
Nevertheless, there was an early precedent for the Court, upon petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into bail for a prisoner charged
historical exigencies confronting the Court as a result of Jefferson's excessive zeal in
pursuit of Burr. On February 21, 1807, Marshall did not have any way of knowing that
it would take until April 1 to transport Burr from the Mississippi Territory. Moreover,
Bollman and Swartwout were entitled to prompt release after prolonged illegal detention.
His second criticism disregards the political realities. Only three weeks before, Congress
had been asked to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and the Senate had agreed. The
Republicans had not abandoned their hostility toward the third branch. It was not
likely that Marshall, already in a confrontation with the President, would encourage a
confrontation with Congress concerning whether the habeas corpus clause was selfexecuting, and thereby strengthen Jefferson's hand in the House of Representatives.
Paschal's thesis is that the habeas corpus clause is self-executing in the federal courts. Id.
at 607. That thesis is inconsistent with the generally held view that Congress was given
control over both the existence and jurisdiction of lower federal courts, and all but the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Accepting his position that article I, section
9, clause 2 is applicable to the whole federal government and not merely to the legislative branch, the more logical conclusion is that Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506
(1859), and Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872) were wrongly decided, than that
some federal court must have habeas corpus jurisdiction. Moreover, Paschal's contention
that in section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress did not confer jurisdiction to
issue the Great Writ, habeas corpus ad subiiciendum, disregards the plain language of
that provision: "[s]hall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose
of an inquiry into the cause of committment." 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 96. Marshall said in
Bollman that the proviso following the quoted language limited the writ to prisoners
in federal custody:
That writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless
where they are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United
States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary
to be brought into court to testify.
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 82. Paschal suggests that despite the plain meaning
of the quoted language, the proviso is applicable only to the auxiliary writs such as. ad
testificandum. See Paschal, supra at 629-32. The suggestion is interesting but not convincing. The "airtight proof" furnished by section 2 of the Circuit Court Act of 1801, id.
at 639, suggests more the need for additional scholarly attention to that statute than for a
priori deductions drawn from its text and retroactively applied to section 14 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789.
107 During the trial of Aaron Burr, Jefferson made the following comments to the
United States District Attorney for Virginia, George Hay:
While Burr's case is depending before the court, I will trouble you, from time to
time, with what occurs to me. I observe that the case of Marbury v. Madison
has been cited, and I think it material to stop at the threshold the citing that
case as authority, and to have it denied to be law. . . . The Constitution intended that the three great branches of the government should be co-ordinate,
& independent of each other. As to acts, thereforc, which are to be done by either,
it has given no controul to another branch.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the United States District Attorney for Virginia, June
2, 1807, in 9 JEFFERSON 53 n.l.
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with treason. 108 Moreover, this early precedent had recently been followed. 10 9 Although Rodney was unwilling to urge Marbury v. Madison,
Justice Johnson, a. Republican appointee, had no such scruples and
dissented on jurisdictional grounds. 10 The Bollman decision on the
jurisdictional issue, wherein the device of habeas corpus with certiorari
was preserved as a means for reviewing the legality of confinement of
federal prisoners, was to prove significant in a later crisis when the
attack on the Court came from Congress rather than the executive 1
Bollman and Swartwout could be held without bail only if the affidavits presented by the government made out a prima facie case that
they had committed treason against the United States. Marshall held
that Jefferson's carefully prepared affidavits did not comport with the
constitutional definition of treason. 112 Therefore, the petitioners were
108 United States v. Hamilton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795). An alleged participant in
the Whiskey Rebellion, the prisoner was admitted to bail although bail had been denied
by the district judge.
109 See Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806). Counsel for Burford had
argued that Marbury v. Madison was distinguishable in that it involved a prerogative
writ (mandamus), whereas habeas corpus was a writ which issued of right by virtue of
article I, section 9, clause 2 of the Constitution. In the Burford opinion, Marshall did not
elucidate a reason for the distinction between that case and Marbury v. Madison. See
Paschal, supra note 106, at 626.
110 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 101-07. Interestingly, Justice Chase joined the dissent. See
id. at 107.
111 See note 156 infra.
112 The Constitution provides in relevant part:
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against
them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person
shall be convicted of Treason unless on the testimony of two Witnesses to the
same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.
U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 3.
In the Court's opinion, Marshall first elaborated upon the constitutional definition of
treason. To constitute this offense, war had to be actually levied. A conspiracy to levy war
against the United States was viewed as distinguishable. To become treasonous, a conspiracy had to evolve into overt action by a group assembled for a treasonable purpose.
Marshall observed that a restrictive interpretation of this clause would remove from
consideration other heinous crimes against society and its institutions, but such a result
was dictated by the limitations within the provision itself. Hence, it became the duty of
the legislature to impose punishment for the violation of general laws that it would
subsequently enact. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 126-27.
The affidavits of Generals Eaton and Wilkinson did reveal a planned military enterprise, but its objective remained unclear. Nevertheless, it seemed that Mexico, and not
the western states and territories, occupied Burr's interest. A letter, written by Burr and
incorporated into Wilkinson's first affidavit, contained peculiarly phrased references to a
non-indigenous populace and religion. See id. at 128-29, 131-32. Moreover, the mere enlistment of men, without more, was not construed as levying war. Id. at 153-34.
Six months later, in United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55 (No. 14,693) (C.C.D. Va.
1807). the definition of treason was arguably made narrower in the court's discussion
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admitted to bail. The Court noted that the affidavits did prima facie
suggest an offense against the neutrality laws (a high misdemeanor),1 13
[b]ut that no part of this crime was committed in the district of
Columbia . . . . It is, therefore, the unanimous opinion of the
court that they cannot be tried in this district. 1 4

Consequently, Jefferson was deprived of the opportunity to try Burr
before circuit judges of his choice and a jury composed of executive
department dependents.
The Bollman decision was announced on February 21, 1807.11
Meanwhile, Burr had surrendered to civil authorities in the Territory
of Mississippi. The grand jury there refused to indict him and filed a
presentment against the President's agents for oppressing him. 116 Nevertheless, Burr was ordered to renew his bond, and, when fear of being
slain induced him to go into hiding, 17 the bond was declared forfeited
and a reward was offered for his apprehension. He was subsequently
taken into military custody and transported by horseback toward Washington, a thousand miles away. Throughout the trip his captors avoided
any place where a civil court might have interfered. 118 By the time they
reached Fredericksburg, Virginia, the Bolman decision had made it
clear that there was no point in taking the captive to Washington. The
President's agents were thereupon ordered to take Burr to Richmond
because one of the overt acts referred to in the government's affidavits
of the meaning of "levying war," id. at 159-61, and the nature of the overt act which will
constitute "levying war." Id. at 161-69. Apparently Marshall employed the opportunity
provided by this related case to expand upon the arguments he initially propounded in
Boilman.
113 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 131.
114 Id. at 135.
115 Id. at 125.

116 See historical note following United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 2 (No. 14,692a)
(C.C.D. Va. 1807), at 24. Joe H. Daviess, the Federalist United States Attorney for the
District of Kentucky, had previously failed to detain Burr by an award of criminal
process. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 1 (No. 14,692) (C.C.D. Ky. 1806); see historical
note supra at 19-20.
117 W. McCAum, supra note 84, at 230-32. Wilkinson had ordered a small contingent
of troops to locate Burr with the vain hope that Burr would resist apprehension. Indeed,
the General had allegedly offered $5,000 for Burr's life. Burr must have recognized that
his death, under these circumstances, would have provided Wilkinson with unrefutable
support for his contentions. Id. at 230.
118 See 3 A. BEVElUGE 366-69. Jefferson maintained that Burr was not arrested
militarily,
but had it been so, every honest man & good citizen is bound, by any means in his
power, to arrest the author of projects so daring and dangerous.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund P. Gaines, July 23, 1807, in 9 JEFFERSON 122.
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had taken place at the extreme western edge of Virginia. 1 9. Unfortunately for Jefferson, this location was in a circuit of which Marshall was
the circuit justice. On April 1, 1807, Marshall admitted Burr to bail
conditioned on his appearance at the next term of the United States
Circuit Court to be held at Richmond on May 22, 1807.120 Burr appeared.
There was extensive pretrial skirmishing while the government's
case was being presented to the grand jury. In one of those skirmishes,
Burr moved for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum to Jefferson for
12
production of a letter and other papers from General Wilkinson. 1
The existence of such material had been disclosed in Jefferson's message
to Congress and it was arguably relevant to the defense. Pursuant to the
President's direct instructions,'122 the United States Attorney resisted
119 General Wilkinson's second affidavit makes references to two possible excursions
which traversed the northwestern portion of Virginia. Swartwout commenced one trek
on Burr's orders from Philadelphia, while an alleged military expedition had proceeded
southward on the Allegheny River. Both journeys then continued along the Ohio River
until that river's intersection with the Mississippi River. See appendix to Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 461.
120 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 2, 15 (No. 14,692a) (C.C.D. Va. 1807). Bail was
set at $10,000. Id.
121 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
122 Jefferson did not object in principle to the request for Wilkinson's letter of
October 21, 1806. Indeed, the letter had already been forwarded to the Attorney General
when he was in Richmond with the expectation that it would be delivered to Hay, the
United States Attorney. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the United States District Attorney for Virginia, June 12, 1807, in 9 JEFFERSON 55 n.l. However, defense counsel insisted upon the original letter as Wilkinson was the government's key witness. They
contended it was imperative that the General be confronted with such evidence written
by his own hand. 25 F. Cas. at 31-32. Jefferson had rejected this demand before it had
ever been made. He informed Hay that he no longer remembered the contents of the
letter and directed Hay to use his discretion in withholding portions of the communication "which are not directly material for the purposes of justice." Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to the United States District Attorney for Virginia, supra at 55 n.l. With respect
to a general request for official orders issued by the Secretaries of War and the Navy
which involved Burr, Jefferson commented:
[I]t seems to cover a correspondence of many months, with such a variety of
officers, civil & military, all over the US, as would amount to the laying open
the whole executive books.
Id. at 56 n.l. Had a particular order been sought or the purpose of any order been
specified, Jefferson observed, then compliance with any subpoena could have been attempted. "[B]ut, with a perfect willingness to do what is right, we are without the indications which may enable us to do it." Id.
After the subpoena had issued (see text accompanying note 124 infra), Jefferson forwarded to Hay copies of correspondence that appeared, to the President, to conform with
its stated demands. Included in this letter, however, was a commentary on the spiritual
adhesive which necessarily maintains the governmental fabric:
The respect mutually due between the constituted authorities, in their official.
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vigorously.128

Marshall, noting that the sixth amendment guaranteed
the defendant compulsory process for attendance of witnesses and that
a statute provided that in capital cases the accused shall be entitled to
process before indictment, ruled that the subpoena should issue. 24
The full history of the subpoena dispute makes clear that Marshall
was well aware of the inherent limitations of judicial power. The order
to issue the subpoena duces tecum was made while evidence was still
being presented to the grand jury and before an indictment had been
returned. The ruling was based upon the Virginia practice and the
federal statute under which an accused person anticipating an indictment had the right to compel the attendance of witnesses who might
convince a grand jury that he should not be indicted. 125 During the
grand jury stage, Jefferson defied the subpoena and the grand jury
never saw the Wilkinson letter. The indictment was nevertheless returned and the trial went forward without this evidence. On September
1, 1807, the petit jury found Burr not guilty on the treason charge. 2 6
When Marshall subsequently held him on bail for trial on a neutrality
act charge, 127 Burr moved to hold the President in contempt for failing
to produce the letter called for in the subpoena duces tecum.128 Meanwhile, Jefferson had advised the United States Attorney to instruct the
United States Marshal not to obey any order of the court looking
toward enforcement because any such effort would be strongly resisted.12 9 In response to the motion, Marshall acted with his usual circumspection and ingenuity. He did not hold the President in contempt.
Rather, he ruled that the Wilkinson letter had been delivered by the
President to the United States Attorney, thereby leaving the decision
as to the propriety of its production to the latter's discretion. 130 Marshall then sat back and awaited Jefferson's decision. The President had
been forced to determine whether he was more interested in Burr's
intercourse, as well as sincere dispositions to do for every one what is just, will
always insure from the executive, in exercising the duty of discrimination confided to him, the same candor & integrity to which the nation has in like manner
trusted in the disposal of it's [sic] judiciary authorities.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the United States District Attorney for Virginia, June
17, 1807, in 9 JEFFERSON 57 n.l.
123 See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 30-32 (No. 14,692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
124 Id. at 33, 38.
125 Id. at 32-33.
126 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 180-81 (No. 14,693) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
127 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 189 (No. 14,694) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
128 See id. at 189-90.
129 See letter from Thomas Jefferson to the United States District Attorney for
Virginia, Aug. 7, 1807, in 9 JEFFERsoN 62 n.l.
130 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 192 (No. 14,G94) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
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destruction than in establishing the reach of executive power to encompass the federal judicial branch. Because he could be placed in the
position of being held in contempt or alternatively having the indictment dismissed, the United States Attorney plaintively asked Jefferson
for a dismissal of the remaining count of the indictment and a new
attempt in a more hospitable circuit.13 1 Jefferson neither yielded nor
let his employee off the hook. The trial on the second count would go
forward. 132 A second subpoena duces tecum caused Jefferson to remark
that he refused to sanction a proceeding so preposterous. 3 The trial
nevertheless went forward without the subpoenaed materials. At one
point, the United States Attorney attempted to abort the entire proceeding by entering a nolle prosequi. 134 Burr's acquittal on the neutrality act charge in Virginia'3 5 relieved Marshall of the necessity for a
ruling that a conviction could not stand because of the sixth amendment violation. The adamant administration then threatened to subject
Burr to a second round of litigation on the misdemeanor charge in
18 7
Ohio,'. 6 but soon abandoned this plan.
It has been suggested recently, on the one hand, that Marshall's
ruling is authority for the proposition that the judicial branch had
inherent power to compel the production of information from the
executive, 3 and, on the other, that Jefferson's noncompliance with the
subpoena is authority for the existence of an executive privilege which
is beyond judicial review. 3 9 Actually the ruling is authority for neither
proposition. No one familiar with the circumstances surrounding the
Burr case would suggest that Marshall seriously believed he could ever
131 3 A. BEVERIDGE 521-22.
132 See letter from Thomas Jefferson to the United States District Attorney for
Virginia, Sept. 7, 1807, in 9 JEFFERSON 63 n.l.
183 Jefferson resented this judicial action which he construed as implying "that the
district courts have a power of commanding the executive government to abandon superior
duties & attend on them." Id. (emphasis in original).
184 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 201 (No. 14,694) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
135 Id.
136 United States Attorney Hay moved to commit Burr "'to that place for trial
where the military expedition is said to have been completed.'" United States v. Burr,
25 F. Cas. 201, 201 (No. 14,694a) (C.C.D. Va. 1807). Marshall then set the former Vice
President's bail at $3,000. Id. at 207.
137 See editorial footnote to United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 2 (No. 14,692a) (C.C.D.
Va. 1807), at 3.
188 See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 8,
Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51
D.D.C. 1973.
189 Letter from James D. St. Clair, special counsel for President Nixon, to Chief
Judge Harold H. Greene of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Feb. 26,
1974, in N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1974, at 20, cols. 5-8.
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locate a United States Marshal who would enforce the Court's writ
against the President. Jefferson's deep and questionable involvement in
its prosecution, 140 his tremendous personal power at the time, and his
almost paranoid attitude toward the federal judiciary in general (and
his cousin, John Marshall, in particular) surely precluded the realization of such a possibility. The thrust of Marshall's message was that
while the Court was powerless to enforce the subpoena, the President
was powerless to obtain Burr's conviction without complying with the
sixth amendment. When the executive resorted to the courts in order to
exercise the power of the United States upon Burr, that power was
limited by the amendment. The decision concerning the type of evidence to be produced was no longer in the hands of the President.
However, the remedy would not be a futile attempt to coerce the executive. Rather, it would be dismissal of the indictment. Thus, in
Marbury v. Madison, where the petitioner was seeking a judgment
which the Court knew would not be enforced, a defiant Levi Lincoln
could dare Marshall to subpoena Jefferson-and Marshall deferred.
But when Jefferson needed a judgment from the circuit court to legitimize the hanging of an enemy, that need supplied the only coercion
that was possible or necessary. The power relationships are entirely
different when the executive is unenthusiastic about any prosecution.
In Marbury v. Madison, John Marshall demonstrated that the
judicial branch must trim its suit to the cloth of its dependence upon
the executive branch for enforcement of a judgment requiring an
execution. In Chase's impeachment, Jefferson learned that one-third of
the Senate could deprive of legitimacy his claim that his mandate
from the electorate could diminish the decisional responsibility of the
Supreme Court. In the attempt to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
the House of Representatives taught him a similar lesson. In Burr's
trial, Jefferson learned that the executive could legitimize the exercise
of power against persons only with the cooperation of the judiciary.
Marshall illustrated that the necessity for cooperative action between
separate and independent branches was the ultimate limitation upon
all federal power. Dispersal of decisional responsibility and interde140 As he witnessed Burr's exoneration through the normal operation of the judicial
process, Jefferson's perspective of the evolving situation indicated a growing personal
obsession:
The criminal [Burr] is preserved to become the rallying point of all the
disaffected and the worthless of the United States, and to be the pivot on which all
the intrigues and the conspiracies which foreign governments may wish to disturb
us with, areto turn.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay, Sept. 4, 1807, in II JEFFERSON 360-61
(library ed. 1904).
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pendence in the exercise of power are the salient features of the national government established by the American Constitution.
It was not until 1867 that the Supreme Court had occasion to consider whether the judicial branch could serve coercive civil process
upon the President. Like Marbury v. Madison, Mississippi v. Johnson14 1
was an original proceeding in the High Court. By this time the practice
in such cases required the filing of a motion for leave to file, on which
motion the Court made a preliminary jurisdictional determination. In
April 1867, Mississippi sought leave to file a complaint seeking to
enjoin the President from carrying out the reconstruction legislation
which Congress had passed over Johnson's veto in March. 142 Johnson
was not in the least interested in enforcing the reconstruction program
of the Radical Republicans. However, unlike Jefferson's era, the center
of political power in the government was now in the House of Representatives rather than the White House. Congress intended to brook
no interference either from the executive or from the judiciary with its
program for the adoption of new constitutional provisions limiting the
power of the states. The best hope of opponents of the fourteenth
amendment was that the Court would declare the reconstruction laws
unconstitutional in a test case, thereby restoring the state governments
that had been displaced by those laws. Such action would open the way
for white-dominated southern legislatures to vote against ratification.
The popular belief was that both the Court and President Johnson
143
would be sympathetic to the southern cause.

Although he was sympathetic with this desired result, Johnson
instructed Attorney General Stanbery to oppose Mississippi's motion
for leave to file the complaint. 144 The attorneys for Mississippi placed
their principal reliance upon Marshall's ruling on the presidential subpoena in the Burr case. 1 45 Stanbery argued:
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867).
See Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 153, § 1 et seq., 14 Stat. 428; Act of March 23, 1867,
ch. 6, § 1 et seq., 15 Stat. 2.
143 That belief was based upon the Court's decision in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 2 (1867), which cast doubt upon the military government provisions of the reconstruction laws.
144 See 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 481.
141
142

145 See id. at 479, 492-95. They argued that if the court in Burr initially possessed
the power to issue the subpoena, it would logically follow that the tribunal could respond to presidential defiance by the process of attachment for contempt. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court was portrayed by counsel as the constitutionally-designated ultimate
decision-maker on questions which involve that instrument to which members of all
three branches had sworn' allegiance. To violate a mandate of the Supreme Court was
therefore equated with violating a mandate of the Constitution. Id. at 494.
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When the subpoena was received by the President, Mr. Jefferson, he did not give to it any notice. He did not even make any return to the court, nor any excuse to the court. He simply wrote a
letter to the district attorney, in which he stated, that he could
not conceive how it was that, under such 'circumstances, the court
should order him to go there by subpoena; that he would not go;
that he did not propose to go; but he said to the district attorney
that there was no difficulty in obtaining the paper in the proper
way. But he would pay no respect to the subpoena. Thereupon
Colonel Burr himself moved for compulsory process to compel the
President to come. Of course that was legitimate. If the court, in
saying that the President was amenable to subpoena, was right, the
court was bound, at the instance of the defendant, to follow it up
by process of attachment to compel obedience to its lawful order. At
that point, however, the court hesitated, and not a step further was
taken toward enforcing the doctrine laid down by the Chief Justice. It then became quite too apparent that a very great error had
been committed. I say a very great error, with the greatest submission to the great Chief Justice, who, on circuit, at nisi prius, suddenly, on a motion of this kind, had held that the President of the
United States was liable to the subpoena of any court as President.
It is not upon any peculiar immunity that the individual has
who happens to be President; upon any idea that he cannot do
wrong; upon any idea that there is any particular sanctity belonging to him as an individual, as is the case with one who has royal
blood in his veins; but it is on account of the office that he holds
that I say the President of the United States is above the process
of any court or the jurisdiction of any court to bring him to account
as President. There is only one court or quasi court that he can be
called upon to answer to for any dereliction of duty, for doing anything that is contrary to law or failing to do anything which is
according to law, and that is not this tribunal but one that sits in
another chamber of this Capitol. There he can be called and tried
and punished, but not here while he is President; and after he has
been dealt with in that chamber and stripped of the robes of office,
and he no longer stands as the representative of the government, then
for any wrong he has done to any individual, for any murder or
any crime of any sort which he has committed as President, then
and not till then can he be subjected to the jurisdiction of the
courts. Then it is the individual they deal with, not the representative of the people.
But what would be the consequences if the court should issue
this subpoena against the President now, and like Mr. Jefferson
he should decline to obey it, not out of any disrespect to this court,
but out of respect to the high office which he fills? If the court
should entertain this case, and direct its subpoena to issue to the
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President, what will come if, as is inevitable, he will not obey
it?...
If, under such advice and such action as is inevitable if this
subpoena is issued, the President declines to obey it, treats the writ
issued to him as one which he cannot obey and dare not obey,
what next must your honors be called upon to do? Precisely146what
the Chief Justice was called upon to do in the case of Burr.
Stanbery's argument ignores the point that Marshall had it within his
power to dismiss Burr's indictment even though it was not within his
power to punish Jefferson for contempt. But Stanbery fully appreciated
the dependence of the judicial branch upon executive enforcement and
the resulting need for judicial self-restraint. If the then current Congress had suddenly shown opposition to the reconstruction laws but the
executive had favored enforcement, the Court might politically have
been in a position to risk an attempt to issue coercive process against
the President. But. in the climate of 1867, the Justices would undoubtedly have been impeached themselves for their attempt. The Court
denied the motion for leave to file the complaint, 147 but carefully
avoided either espousing or rejecting Mississippi's interpretation of the
Burr ruling. Chief Justice Salmon Chase, distinguishing a mandamus
148
against a cabinet officer for the performance of a ministerial duty,
wrote:
Id. at 483, 484-85.
Id. at 501.
148 Despite Marshall's advisory opinion on mandamus in Marbury v. Madison, the
Court had subsequently held that the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not confer mandamus
jurisdiction upon the lower federal courts. See McIntire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504
(1813). But the District of Columbia Act, unlike the Circuit Court Act of 1801, was not
repealed by the Republicans:
That the laws of the state of Virginia, as they now exist, shall be and continue
in force in that part of the District of Columbia, which was ceded by the said
state to the United States, and by them accepted for the permanent seat of
government; and that the laws of the state of Maryland, as they now exist, shall
be and continue in force in that part of the said district which was ceded by that
state to the United States, and by them accepted as aforesaid.
146
147

That there shall be a court in said district which shall be called the circuit court
of the district of Columbia; and the said court and the judges thereof shall have
all the powers by law vested in the circuit courts and the judges of the circuit
courts of the United States.
Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, §§ 1, 3, 2 Stat. 103-05.
This piece of Federalist legislation became the jurisdictional predicate for actions in
mandamus against subordinate executive officers in the district court of the District of
Columbia. See Kendall v. United States ex tel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 522, 618-19 (1838).
Thus, by 1867 it was clear that executive officers below the President were not immune
from civil process in connection with the performance of their duties. Since a state was
the plaintiff in Mississippi v. Johnson, the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction.
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The duty ...
imposed on the President [by the reconstruction
acts] is in no just sense ministerial. It is purely executive and
political.
An attempt on the part of the judicial department of the government to enforce the performance of such duties by the President
might be justly characterized, in the language of Chief Justice
Marshall, as "an absurd and excessive extravagance."
It is true that in the instance before us the interposition of the
court is not sought to enforce action by the Executive under constitutional legislation, but to restrain such action under legislation
alleged to be unconstitutional. But we are unable to perceive that
this circumstance takes the case out of the general principles which
forbid judicial interference with the exercise of Executive discre149
tion.
Mississippi v. Johnson does not reach the question whether the
President is immune from civil process as a corollary from the Court's
dependence upon the executive branch for enforcement of such process.
It holds only that a complaint seeking to control the exercise of the
President's discretion in the execution of the laws does not state a
cause of action and will not be filed. 150 In recognizing the existence of
such presidential discretion, this case may be a precedent which sheds
some light on the impoundment issue. It should not be given too
expansive a reading in support of unreviewable executive discretion,
however, for in reality it was a decision in favor of Congress rather than
the Presidency.
In the spring of 1867, the Court and the Presidency both were
approaching the nadir of their respective powers. The decision in
Dred Scott v. Sandford 51 had (at least for the winning side in the
Civil War) deprived the Court of the moral authority to pronounce
upon the legitimacy of congressional power. 112 Moreover, a minority
party President, not in sympathy with the plans of the Congress, was in
office. The Presidency reached the nadir of its power with Johnson's
For a discussion of 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970), the present mandamus statute, see note
206 inJra and accompanying text.
149 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 499.
150 In most succinct fashion, the Court stated:
But we are fully satisfied that this court has no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin
the President in the performance of his official duties; and that no such bill
ought to be received by us.
Id. at 501.
51 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
152 See 1 C. FAnRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-1888, at 26 & n.82 (1971).
(Volume VI of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the

United States).
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impeachment on March 3, 1868.153 The lowest point of the Court's
power occurred in the passage of legislation in March of 1868
which dictated to that branch a posture of non-interference with congressional reconstruction,1 " and the Court's humiliating submission
1 55
to that dictation in Ex parte McCardle.
But the need for legitimacy

remained. Although after Grant's inaugural in March of 1869, the
Court faced an aggressive Congress and a President in sympathy with
its objectives, it soon reasserted its authority to pronounce upon the
legitimacy of the exercise of power by the other branches. In Ex parte
Yerger, 56 the Court reestablished its authority to pass upon the validity
of the reconstruction acts in a habeas corpus case. By this time the
danger to ratification of the fourteenth amendment had passed, and a
member of the executive branch took steps to preserve the Court's independence .from an expected attack in Congress. After the Court
pronounced its jurisdictional opinion in Yerger's appeal, Attorney
General Charles Hoar arranged a settlement which avoided the necessity for a decision on the merits. 157 Hoar's compromise was an example of
the kind of statesmanship which is essential to the continued operation
of a system of dispersed decisional responsibility and interdependence
in the exercise of power.
The issue of coercive judicial process against the President himself
has never been before the Court since Mississippi v. Johnson. Neither
that case nor the Burr precedent resolves this issue. It will be resolved,
if at all, by political rather than legal considerations. One cannot say
153 See id. at 521-27.
154 The enactment stated in pertinent part:
That so much of the [Habeas Corpus Act] as authorizes an appeal from the
judgment of the circuit court to the Supreme Court of the United States, or the
exercise of any such jurisdiction by said Supreme Court on appeals which have
been or may hereafter be taken, be, and the same is, hereby repealed.
Act of March 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44.
155 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). McCardle appealed from the denial of a petition
of habeas corpus. The appeal would have tested the legality of his confinement pursuant to one of the reconstruction laws. To prevent the Court from passing upon that
issue Congress, after argument but before decision, and while the appeal was sub judice,
repealed the Court's appellate jurisdiction under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867.
Johnson had vetoed the repealer but it was passed over his veto. Act of March 27, 1868,
ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44; see note 154 supra. The Court then dismissed the appeal for want
of jurisdiction.
156 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869). The Court relied in part upon its decision in Ex
parte Bollman. See id. at 97-98. See note 106 supra and accompanying text for a discussion
of Bollman.
157 The history of the restoration of the Court's authority from McCardle to Yerger
and Attorney General Hoar's role therein are recounted in I C. FAIRMAN, supra note 152,
at 433-514, 558-618.
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that the Supreme Court will never attempt to direct coercive judicial
process against the President. It may do so, but before it does, it should
be certain that the result of the decree is one desired by a majority in
the House of Representatives and by two-thirds of the Senate-for
therein lies its only sanction. As a rule of decision, the previous sentence
is hardly a neutral principle. 158 However, the framers of the Constitution did not establish a jurisprudential framework. They established a
political system for the distribution and control of power which requires
the concurrence of at least two branches of government for its legitimate exercise in most, if not all instances.
The fact that the Court must depend upon the executive for the
execution of its judgments has undoubtedly had an important influence in shaping not only its substantive decisions but also those doctrines of self-restraint by which it often avoids or postpones decisions.
A good case can be made for the proposition that the political question
decisions, for example, are based primarily upon the Court's concern
about executive revision by nonenforcement. 159 Occasionally, however,
the Court has almost gone to the brink in risking revision of its judgments by another branch.
One of those occasions was the 1952 decision in the steel seizure
case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 60 In the 56 day period
from seizure to Supreme Court decision eleven opinions were filed in
that case by ten judges.' 6' Of those ten judges, only two discussed any
See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L.
15-17 (1959). Professor Wechsler maintains that judicial decisions should be
upon principles that reflect a certain neutrality and generality in their applicaall the issues of a controversy so that their import might survive the particular
involved.
159 In Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), it probably seemed unlikely that
the President would permit a United States Marshal to execute a judgment against the
defendants for acts growing out of the performance of their duties in a state government
he had recognized. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), Justice Brennan wrote:
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the
settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although
each has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a function of the
separation of powers.
Id. at 217. In a "power" sense an action against the state defendants in Baker v. Carr
can only refer to the executive's willingness to enforce a judgment.
160 343 U.S. 579 (1952). The order for seizure had been issued on April 8, 1952. Exec.
Order No. 10,340, 3 C.F.R. 861 (1952) [comp. 1949-1953].
161 Combining with two other steel companies, Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company instituted an action against the Secretary of Commerce, Charles Sawyer, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief aimed at terminating the defendant's possession of
plaintiffs' facilities which had been seized pursuant to President Truman's executive
order. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 978, 979-80 (D.D.C. 1952).
The district court relied upon refinements in Chief Justice Chase's opinion in Mississippi
158

REv. 1,
founded
bility to
outcome
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possible limitations on the powers of the judicial branch. The most
puzzling omission is that of Chief Justice Vinson who dissented from
the grant of an injunction against Commerce Secretary Sawyer. 162 In a
v. Johnson in stating that "the coercive remedy of an injunction may not be directed
against [the President]." Id. at 980. Since a remedy in damages was available (irrespective
of the legality of the taking), and the plaintiffs had failed to show that irreparable
damage would be sustained, the court ruled that injunctive relief was inappropriate. Id.
at 981.
Youngstown subsequently reappeared before the district court, again seeking injunctive relief. This time, however, plaintiffs' argument specifically focused upon the legality
of the President's authority to issue the executive order. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569, 572 (D.D.C. 1952). Noting that it was not addressing
itself to the merits of the labor controversy involved but to the possible constitutional and
9tatutory grounds for the seizure, id. at 572-73, the court found that the history of constitutional law regarding the powers distributed to the three government branches did
not support the view that the takeover of the steel corporations was legitimized by the
theory of inherent or residual powers of the President. See id. at 574. The court observed
that there was ample precedent for enjoining unlawful or unconstitutional action by
executive officers. This posture was facilitated by Judge Pine's failure to adopt Judge
Holtzoff's reasoning twenty days earlier that pragmatically, the President was the
interested party. Id. at 576. Finding such illegality to exist, id., and determining the
equities to be in favor of the steel corporation, the court granted injunctive relief on
April 29. Id. at 577.
In Sawyer v. United States Steel Co., 197 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1952), the Secretary of
Commerce appealed the decision of the district court. This case fails to allude to the
question of the constitutionality of the President's action; instead, the decision of the
court turns on the determination that, in view of public interest and national security
considerations, injunctive relief was premature. See id. at 584. Consequently, the court
ordered a stay of the injunction pending the outcome of certiorari proceedings filed
before the Supreme Court. Id. at 585 & n.l.
On May 3, the Court granted certiorari, 343 U.S. 937 (1952), but Justice Burton, with
the concurrence of Justice Frankfurter, wrote that he would have denied certiorari until
the court of appeals heard the case on its merits. Id. at 938.
Ultimately, on June 2, Justice Black, writing for the Court, decided that the controversy was ripe for adjudication on the record presented. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952). The Court held that in the absence of congressional
authorization or constitutional provision, the President could not rely upon the theory
of "implied" or "aggregate" powers to legitimize the seizure of property. The district
court injunction was accordingly affirmed. See id. at 587-89. Justices Frankfurter, Douglas,
Jackson, Burton and Clark wrote separate concurring opinions, id. at 593-667, and Chief
Justice Vinson, joined by Justices Reed and Minton, dissented. Id. at 667-710.
162 343 U.S. at 667. In upholding the President's constitutional authority to seize
property in emergency situations, the dissenting opinion analyzed the context within
which these powers were exercised, the motivation for the seizure, and executive action
which reflects either a proper exercise of presidential leadership as the Commander in
Chief or as the individual who is obligated by article II, section 3 of the Constitution
to "take [cjare that the [l]aws be faithfully executed." See id. at 667-710. It is interesting
to note that a significant part of Justice Vinson's opinion was derived from the arguments contained in the brief of John W. Davis in the case of United States v. Midwest
Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915). See 343 U.S. at 689-93. As Solicitor General during the Taft
administration, Davis urged in Midwest Oil an expansive view of executive prerogative to
legitimatize the withdrawal of oil laden lands from the public domain pending con-
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44 page opinion which is a virtual treatise on presidential initiative, he
concedes to the majority the supremacy of the judiciary in a single
sentence:
In this litigation for return of plaintiff's properties, we assume
that defendant Charles Sawyer is not immune from judicial restraint and that plaintiffs are entitled to equitable relief if we find
that the Executive Order under which defendant acts is unconstitutional.163
When John J. Wilson, the attorney for one of the confiscated steel
companies,164 first appeared before Judge Holtzoff on April 8 requesting a temporary restraining order, Judge Holtzoff did not see the
problem as simplistically as Chief Justice Vinson. 6 5 He wrote:
There are several matters that the court must weigh in this
instance. Although, nominally, and technically, an injunction, if
granted, would run solely against the defendant Sawyer, actually
and in essence it would be an injunction against the President of
the United States, because it would have the effect of nullifying and
stopping the carrying out of the President's Executive Order for
the seizure of the plants. It is very doubtful, to say the least, whether
a Federal Court has authority to issue an injunction against the
President of the United States, in person, State of Mississippi v.
Johnson . . . .In that case, Chief Justice Chase made the following statement... :

"The Congress is the legislative department of the
Government; the President is the executive department.
Neither can be restrained in its action by the judicial
department; though the acts of both, when performed, are,
in proper cases, subject to its cognizance."
This does not mean that the President is above the law, or that he
has unlimited powers, but merely that the coercive remedy of an
injunction may not be directed against him, just as it may not be
directed against the Congress.'
1 It was said by Chief Justice Stone in United States
v. Butler . .. that the only check on the exercise of judicial power is the Court's own sense of self-restraint. 166
gressional action. In Youngstown, Davis served as chief counsel for the steel companies
and argued for a much narrower interpretation of presidential power.
163 343 U.S. at 677-78.
164 Twenty-two years later Mr. Wilson, representing different clients, was to advance
an expansive claim of executive prerogative which is an interesting contrast to the position
he argued on behalf of the steel companies in 1951. See N.Y. Times, July 26, 1973, at 26,
cols. 1-8 (excerpts of Wilson's attempt to distinguish his position in Youngstown).
165 See 103 F. Supp. at 980.
166 Id. at 980 & 980-81 n.1 (quoting from Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)

475, 500 (1867) and United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 79 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting),
respectively).
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The footnote is interesting. One may doubt whether "self-restraint" in
the absence of rewards for restraint and sanctions for excesses will
operate to guide individual conduct, let alone political institutions.
What Judge Holtzoff probably had in mind was that judicial powerlessness imposed self-restraint as a matter of necessity. Of the six justices
in the Court's majority in Youngstown, each of whom filed an opinion,
only Justice Frankfurter displayed an awareness of the separation of
powers issue which troubled Judge Holtzoff. Great husbander of the
political and moral power of the Court that he was, 167 Frankfurter
alone among the Justices recognized that the starting point was not the
powers of the executive-it was the powers of the judiciary. Early in
his long concurring opinion he states:
So here our first inquiry must be not into the powers of the
President, but into the powers of a District Judge to issue a temporary injunction in the circumstances of this case. . . . To start

with a consideration of the relation between the President's powers
and those of Congress-a most delicate matter that has occupied
the thoughts of statesmen and judges since the Nation was founded
and will continue to occupy their thoughts as long as our democracy lasts-is to start at the wrong end. 168
These thoughts suggest that Frankfurter was concerned with the interdependent power relationships that had worried Judge Holtzoff. However, in the next sentence Frankfurter trails off into a subject entirely
unrelated to the fundamental issue of the Court's power to coerce the
executive, and concludes:
A plaintiff is not entitled to an injunction if money damages
would fairly compensate him for any wrong he may have suffered.169
Since a federal statute had said as much since 1789, this statement was
0
hardly news.y
Although Frankfurter's opinion in Youngstown never came to
grips with Judge Holtzoff's concern, it nevertheless reflects a fundamentally sound political sense. Rather than focusing, as did most of
the other opinion writers, on the perplexities of " 'residual,' 'inherent,'
'moral,' 'implied,' 'aggregate,' 'emergency'" or other powers of the
167 It should be noted that Justice Frankfurter and Justice Burton, reluctant to
bypass the court of appeals, initially voted to deny certiorari and filed an opinion urging
caution in the assertion of judicial power. See 343 U.S. at 938.
168 343 U.S. at 595.

169 Id.
170 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 82.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:435

executive branch,17 1 Frankfurter looked to the attitude of Congress. He
found that Congress had passed the Taft-Hartley Act 72 over the President's veto. In his veto message, the President had requested the very
seizure powers which in the instant case he had purported to exercise, and had been turned down.173 The rejection was fairly explicit.
President Truman probably assumed thereafter that the two-thirds
who rejected his request for exclusive exercise of emergency powers
in national emergency labor disputes would have impeached had he
defied the Supreme Court. The magnitude of the aggrandizement of
executive power asserted by the administration and the hostile attitude
of Congress toward the President's notions of labor-management relations suggested the risking of executive revision by nonenforcement of
the judgment in this case.
As a premise for the conclusion that the President lacked the inherent national emergency powers he claimed, the congressional rejection of Truman's ideas on the manner in which national emergency
labor disputes should be resolved is not compelling. As a premise for the
conclusion that the Court was on safe ground in confronting the executive branch, however, the congressional response to the presidential
veto message is eminently sound. The Court was dealing with a President who had steadfastly refused to submit to the legislative judgment
and make use of available statutory devices. 174 His attitude toward the
legislation was reminiscent of Caesar Rodney's decision not to rely on
Marbury v. Madison in Bollman.175 The Court in the steel seizure case
safely allied itself with the legislative branch, legislative decisional
responsibility, and congressional political power. In doing so, it de76
prived the President's exercise of power of any claim to legitimacy.
343 U.S. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring in judgment).
29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1970).
173 See 343 U.S. at 599-600 & nn.2 & 3.
174 Justice Frankfurter astutely observed:
In any event, nothing can be plainer than that Congress made a conscious
choice of policy ....
In formulating legislation for dealing with industrial
conflicts, Congress could not more clearly and emphatically have withheld authority than it did in 1947 ....
Congress acted with full consciousness of what
it was doing and in the light of much recent history.
Id. at 602.
175 See notes 105 & 107 supra and accompanying text.
176 The decision by the Court to grant certiorari initiated the first step in challenging
the claim of legitimacy of the President's actions toward the steel companies and, more
significantly, toward Congress. The order granting certiorari provided:
The order of the District Court entered April 30, 1952, is hereby stayed pending disposition of these cases by this Court. It is further ordered, as a provision
of this stay, that Charles S. Sawyer, Secretary of Commerce . . . take no action
to change any term or condition of employment while this stay is in effect unless
171
172
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Undoubtedly public awareness of the legitimacy of the Court's action
would have been increased had the six Justices who comprised the
majority been able to agree upon "[a] principled decision . . . that
rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that
in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result
that is involved." 1 " But from the viewpoint of power, the prior concurrence of Congress obviated the necessity which faced Marshall in
Marbury v. Madison-that of devising a decision which would not require execution of the judgment. In the end the President acquiesced.
This result has remained entrenched, for the Taft-Hartley Act, not
executive prerogative, still regulates the Nation's labor-management
relationships.
Brinkmanship in risking revision by the other coordinate branch
was involved in Powell v. McCormack.17 During the 89th Congress, a
committee of the House of Representatives reported to the House that
Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. had falsified travel expense
vouchers and had caused payment of illegal salaries to House personnel.1

79

No formal action was taken in the 89th Congress. When the 90th

Congress met to organize in January of 1967, the House adopted a
resolution providing for a select committee to determine Powell's
eligibility. s0 On February 23, 1967, that select committee recommended
that the New York Congressman be sworn and seated but that he also
be censured by the House, fined forty thousand dollars and that he
forfeit his seniority.' 8 ' Instead, the House chose to adopt Resolution
such change is mutually agreed upon by the steel companies . . . and the bargaining representatives of the employees.
343 U.S. at 938. This order had the effect of leaving the executive branch in possession
of the steel mills. The condition attached to the stay nevertheless had the effect of depriving possession by the executive of any claim of legitimacy. Thus, the action on the stay
deprived the decision concerning the possible imposition of a wage settlement of any
claim of legitimacy while the property remained in the hands of the President pendente
lite. Just as Jefferson had possession of Marbury's commission, Truman had possession
of the mills, at least temporarily. However, neither President could claim legitimate
possession.
177 Wechsler, supra note 158, at 19.
178 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
179 The Special Subcommitte on Contracts of the Committee on House Administration had investigated certain expenditures of the Committee on Education and Labor
which Powell chaired. The subsequent subcommittee report concluded that Powell and
members of his staff had deceived House authorities with respect to travel expenses. The
report also noted the existence of strong evidence that, pursuant to Powell's direction,
illegal salary payments had been made to the Congressman's wife. H.R. REP. No. 2349,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1966).
180 This House resolution passed by an overwhelming vote of 363 to 65. H.R. Res.
1, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. Rac. 26-27 (1967).
181 The select committee argued that Powell met the standing qualifications of
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No. 278 by which Powell was excluded and the Speaker directed to
notify the Governor of New York that the seat representing the 18th
Congressional District was vacant. Powell and thirteen voters of this
congressional district filed a suit in the District Court for the District of
Columbia against the Speaker, five other congressmen both individually
and as representatives of the class formed by the House membership,
the Clerk, the Sergeant-at-Arms and the Doorkeeper, alleging that he
met the qualifications for membership in the House and that the
Constitution prohibited the imposition of any other qualifications. 82
The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the exclusion was
unconstitutional, a permanent injunction against the execution of
House Resolution No. 278 and directing Speaker John McCormack to
administer the oath, the Clerk of the House to perform for Powell the
services usually rendered to congressmen, the Sergeant-at-Arms to pay
him his salary, and the Doorkeeper to admit him to the Chamber. 88s In
dismissing the complaint on April 7, 1967, Jhdge Hart concluded that
for the Court to decide this case on the merits and to grant any
of the relief prayed for in the complaint would constitute a clear
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. For this Court
to order any member of the House of Representatives of the United
States, any officer of the House, or any employee of the House to do
or not to do an act related to the organization or membership of
that House would be for the Court to crash through a political
thicket into political quicksand. 184
Botanical and geological metaphors aside, Judge Hart -would seem to
have a point. The constitutional text suggests a preference by the
Founding Fathers that Congress have exclusive authority to resolve
controversies which are unique to and arise from the legislative
branch.18 5
In contrast to its procedurally premature involvement in the steel
seizure case, the Court decided on May 29 not to grant certiorari in this
case prior to judgment in the court of appeals. 18 6 The appeal proceeded
in the ordinary way to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
article I, section 2 of the Constitution, but that he had maintained an unauthorized
privilege and immunity from processes of New York courts; that he had wrongfully
channelled House funds; and that he had issued false reports on expenditures of foreign
currency to the Committee on House Administration. H.R. RrP. No. 27, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 31-32 (1967).
182 395 U.S. at 493.
183 Id. at 494.
184 266 F. Supp. 354, 359 (D.D.C. 1967).
185 See U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, §§ 5, 6.
186 387 U.S. 933 (1967).
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Circuit. Before the court reached the case, however, New York held a
new election pursuant to Resolution No. 278 at which Mr. Powell was
reelected. 187 When the case came before the District of Columbia Circuit, Powell had not presented himself again to the 90th Congress or
requested the administration of the oath. 88 On February 28, 1968, the
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed Judge Hart, 89 and on November
18, 1968, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 9 0 Forty-six days remained in the life of the 90th Congress.' 91 More than five months after
the November 1968 congressional election, the Court set the case down
for argument. 19 2 In that 1968 election, Powell was again elected as the
representative from his congressional district and was seated in the
91st Congress. 9 3
By the time the case came before the Supreme Court in April of
187 N.Y. Times, April 12, 1967, at 1, col. 5.
188 395 U.S. at 494 n.5.
189 Powell v. McCormack, 395 F.2d 577, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The court's analysis was
divided into four sections. Jurisdictional considerations were first examined from general
constituional authority, case or controversy, and statutory grant perspectives. Id. at 587-91.
The court found: "Article III grants judicial power to cases 'arising under' the Constitution as a whole, not under any particular provision of it." Id. at 589. The court further
determined that Powell's Claim to a seat presented a valid case or controversy. Id. at 590.
Jurisdiction was found in 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1964), id. at 590-91, which was deemed
"broad enough to operate as an affirmative jurisdictional grant here." Id. at 591.
Next the court analyzed whether this case involved a political question of the type
that would render the case nonjusticiable. Id. at 591-93. It scrutinized the facts in light
of six criteria, originally set forth by Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962), which were construed as "'symptoms'" of a non-justiciable political question.
395 F.2d at 593. Although it found several "symptoms" of nonjusticiability, the court
reasoned that if the district court could provide a form of relief which would protect
Powell's rights, the case was justiciable. See id. at 595-96. The court found, however,
that requests for coercive equitable relief which invited a confrontation between equal
branches of government were "inappropriate for judicial consideration." Id. at 596. It decided further that a declaratory judgment was also inappropriate because it would
not end the controversy but "might well tend to resurrect the very conflict our holding
of inappropriateness seeks to avoid." Id. at 597. The voting rights claims of members of
his constituency were also deemed inapposite to the distinct question of seating rights.
See id. at 597-98.
The speech or debate clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, was the third area discussed. The
court examined the history and purpose of this dause which grants limited personal
immunity to the members of the House and suggested, without actually deciding the
matter, that "the Clause would operate as a bar to the maintenance of this suit." Id. at 602.
Finally the court summarily disposed of the claim that Powell had been entitled to have
had a three-judge court sit below. Id. at 602-03.
190 Powell v. McCormick, 393 U.S. 949 (1968).
191 The 90th Congress officially terminated on January 3, 1969. 115 CONG. RFC. 3
(1969).
192 See 395 U.S. at 486.
193 115 CONG. Rzc. 34 (1969).
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1969, it had shrunk considerably. The voter petitioners could not contend that they were entitled to have Powell represent their viewpoint on
legislation unless they were prepared to contend that, by virtue of his
exclusion, the entire legislative output of the 90th Congress was unconstitutional. That extravagant position was not advanced. He was
representing them in the 91st Congress. Whatever claim the voter
petitioners had was moot by any rational standard of mootness.
Powell's claim remained. His participation in the 90th Congress was
considered as moot an issue as the claim of his constituents. 19 4 No one
other than the Speaker and the members of the House could grant him
the seniority he requested.195 As early as Kilbourn v. Thompson,19 in
1881, and as recent as Dombrowski v. Eastland,197 in 1967, the Court
had held that the speech or debate clause' 98 granted members of
Congress immunity from civil process seeking to question their
vote on any matter in Congress. 199 The Court reaffirmed that holdSee 395 U.S. at 499-500.
With respect to the legality of the retention of Powell's salary pursuant to Resolution No. 278, the Court remanded the case to the court of appeals to determine whether
the congressman was entitled to a mandamus against the Sergeant at Arms. Because the
case had been decided on grounds of justiciability in the court below, this question had
not been heretofore considered. Id. at 500 & n.16.
196 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
197 387 U.S. 82 (1967).
198 U.S. CoNs'r. art. I, § 6, provides:
The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their
Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United
States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace,
be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or
Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.
199 Kilbourn was a private citizen who instituted an action for false imprisonment
against the Speaker, Sergeant-at-Arms, and members of a House committee for their role
in his imprisonment for failure to respond to a subpoena duces tecum. See 103 U.S. at
173-77. Although it found that the powers exercised by this committee lacked constitutional foundation, and that its actions with respect to Kilbourn were consequently unlawful, id. at 196, the Court ruled that the speech or debate clause shielded those defendants who were members of the House from liability. In formulating a standard of
applicability, however, the Court rejected the viewpoint of unbounded immunity, choosing
to restrict its protection "to things generally done in a session of the House by one of its
members in relation to the business before it." Id. at 204.
Accused of tortious participation in a conspiracy to seize petitioners' property and
records in violation of their fourth amendment rights, Senator Eastland, as Chairman of
the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, successfully interposed
the speech or debate clause in his defense. See 387 US. at 83-85. The Court noted that
[i]t is the purpose and office of the doctrine of legislative immunity, having its
roots as it does in the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution ... that legislators engaged "in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity" . . . should be
protected not only from the consequences of litigation's results but also from the
burden of defending themselves.
Id. at 84-85 (citations omitted). For a discussion of post-1967 cases involving the speech
194
195
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ing.200 But while adhering to the position taken in these cases with respect to suits against congressional agents and employees,2 0' it held that
the case could continue against the Clerk, the Sergeant-at-Arms and the
Doorkeeper. 20 2 In 1969, however, the Clerk could no longer administer
the oath of the 90th Congress, the Doorman could no longer open the
door to the 90th Congress, and the Clerk, the Doorman, and the Sergeant-at-Arms acting in concert could not force the 91st Congress to

recognize Powell's seniority. What remained was a claim for compensation. The Sergeant-at-Arms had the duty of drawing checks on the
United States for that purpose. Pursuant to article I, section 6, Powell
had a constitutional right to compensation for services in the House. By
obeying Resolution No. 278, arguably the Sergeant-at-Arms had deprived him of that constitutional right. But the effect of Resolution
No. 278, insofar as it bound the Sergeant-at-Arms not to pay Powell,
was fully dissipated when New York held the special election mandated
by the Resolution and Powell was reelected. He could hardly have any
personal claim against the Sergeant-at-Arms for pay which might be due
after May 1, 1967-the date the formal certification of his reelection was
received by the House-since Powell chose not to reappear in the 90th
Congress and request the Clerk to administer the oath. Thus the most
for which the Sergeant-at-Arms could be personally liable, assuming
that good faith compliance with Resolution No. 278 would not be
recognized as a defense, 203 would be Powell's salary from March 1, 1967
or debate clause, see generally Note, Speech or Debate Clause-Scope of Legislative Immunity Restrictively Extended to Aides, 4 SYMtoN HALL L. REv. 277 (1972).
200 395 U.S. at 505-06.
201 The Sergeant-at-Arms in Kilbourn did not escape liability for executing the
resolution by which the petitioner had been imprisoned because the speech or debate
clause did not serve to protect everyone associated with governmental machinery. See 103
U.S. at 205. Similarly, counsel to the Internal Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee
remained vulnerable despite the protection afforded Senator Eastland because the constitutional provision "'deserves greater respect than where an official acting on behalf of the
legislature is sued.'" 387 U.S. at 85 (quoting from Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 US. 367, 378
(1951)).
The judicial interpretation of the speech or debate clause was modified in this
respect in Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972). Recognizing the augmented responsibility assumed by legislative aides, the Court held that the Senator's assistant,
Dr. Leonard Rodberg, was entitled to identical protection for legislative activities that
would have been shielded had they been performed by the elected representative personally. Id. at 618. The Court rejected, however, Senator Gravel's contention that "legislative activities" included all endeavors that could be consistent with the informing function
of Congress. See id. at 625-27.
202 395 U.S. at 506, 550.
203 Good faith performance of discretionary governmental functions has been recognized as a defense consideration in cases involving the executive branch of both state and
federal governments. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1347-48 (2d Cir. 1972);
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to May 1, 1967, a total of $5,000. Any personal claim against the
Sergeant-at-Arms arose under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a) and thus did not meet
the $10,000 jurisdictional amount requirement.2 0 4 District court jurisdiction could have been established under the Tucker Act2 5 for claims

of less than $10,000, but the suit was not against the United States.
Only the mandamus statute, which does not have jurisdictional amount
limitation, remained. 20 6 If the Sergeant-at-Arms had a mandatory duty
to draw a check for $5,000, subject matter jurisdiction existed. Whether
the duty was mandatory or involved the exercise of some degree of
discretion (in view of the possible claim of the Treasurer of the United
States for reimbursement of Powell's allegedly illegal expenditures),
20 7
is at least a debatable point which the Court never considered.
The Court ordinarily does not make a constitutional adjudication
when a nonconstitutional basis of decision is available.208 In Powell,
cf. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 42 U.S.L.W. 4543, 4545 n.4 (U.S. April 17, 1974); Safeguard Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Miller, 472 F.2d 732, 734 (3d Cir. 1973) (dictum).
204 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest
and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.
205 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970) provides in relevant part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the
Court of Claims, o:
(2) Any other civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of
Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express
or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated
damages in cases not sounding in tort....
(b) Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the
United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for
injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within
the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
206 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature
of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any
agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.
207 The House select committee had recognized a claim for reimbursement in its
recommendation that payment of a proposed $40,000 fine be employed to offset any
liability for improperly maintaining Mrs. Powell on his payroll and for improperly spending government funds. 395 F.2d at 583-84.
208 See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 345, 347 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring). Thus, a pendent state law claim should be decided before a
federal constitutional claim, Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909),
and a pendent federal statutory claim should be considered prior to a federal constitutional claim. Hagans v. Lavine, 42 U.S.LW. 4381, 4388 (U.S. March 25, 1974).
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that rule was stood on its head and serious, nonconstitutional :jurisdic,
tional issues were disregarded to find some ground for claiming
authority to pass on the constitutional issue. Even Professor Wechsler 20 9
ought to concede that this was a constitutional issue for which a decision was not indispensable.
In the context of this paper, however, the most interesting aspect
of Powell is the extent to which the Court exposed itself to possible
revision of its judgment by the House of Representatives. Since the
only likely final judgment was .a mandamus against the Sergeant-atArms of the 90th Congress, the House could simply have discharged the
defendant, appointed a new Sergeant-at-Arms and ignored the Court.
One wonders why, in this case, the Court reached so far for a vehicle by
which to put itself in conflict with the legislative branch when so many
time-tested means were available to it to avoid rendering its essentially
advisory opinion. It is true that two-thirds of Marbury v. Madison is
also an advisory opinion, but there are two significant differences.
Marshall devised a judgment that did not require execution, thereby
insulating the Court from the possibility of executive revision, while
the Warren Court risked legislative revision. The second difference is
the magnitude of the underlying constitutional issue. Great constitutional issues do require that the Court risk going to the limit of its
moral and political power, and Jefferson's threats against the judiciary
were indeed threats to dismantle the system of dispersed powers which
the framers had devised. In Youngstown, the issue was of comparable
magnitude. A President, having suffered the enactment of the TaftHartley Act over his veto, determined that he would handle, by executive order, industrial relations in a manner Congress had rejected. The
claimed power of the House of Representatives to exclude a member
for reasons identical to those for which it could have expelled 1 0
was hardl? a threat of the same magnitude to the system of dispersed
powers.
Why, then, did the Court go so far out of its way in Powell to
lay down the gauntlet to Congress? It is true, of course, that to the eye
of history, its advisory opinion may have deprived the exclusion of
Powell of any claim to legitimacy-just as Marshall's advisory opinion
had deprived the presidential withholding of Marbury's commission of
any claim to legitimacy. Yet, Powell hardly seems the appropriate case
209 See notes 158 & 177 supra and accompanying text.
210 The Court made it clear that it was passing only upon the constitutionality of
Powell's exclusion pursuant to article I, section 5, dause 1, and not upon the House's
power to expel under clause 2 of section 5. See 395 U.S. at 550.
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in which the brink of the Court's power should have been approached,
unless the Justices had in mind some larger issue.
That larger issue may have been perceived by Raoul Berger, who
211
suggests that Powell is authority for judicial review of impeachments.
This is a challenging thought. However, he couples that case with Baker
v. Carr,212 which actually teaches very little about separation of powers
in the intra-federal context since the decree ran against state officials
and there was no serious threat that the federal executive would not
enforce it. This much is clear: the text of article I, section 3, clause 6213
is at least as ambiguous with respect to judicial review as the text of
article I, section 5, clause 1.214 Nor can any comfort be drawn from the
fact that in the thirteen instances in which impeachments have been
215
voted in the House, only one has sought judicial review.
211 In his discussion of the possibility of judicial review, Professor Berger displays
some awareness of the fundamental differenices between the British and American Constitutions. See R. Berger, supra note 66, at 103-21. Under the contemporary British Constitution, it is necessary for the government (the executive) to command a majority in
Parliament or to make way for another government. Thus, no one would be impeached
unless either the government itself had already removed him from whatever position of
power he had occupied, or the government of which he was a part had been voted out of
office. Impeachment served investigative and punitive functions but not a limitation of
power purpose. In the United States, by contrast, the government (the executive) was
protected from removal, except quadrennially, and the judiciary was granted life tenure.
As the test of article I, section 3, clause 7 makes clear, the only purpose of impeachment
under the American Constitution is removal from a position of power. Speculation that
the framers intended to adopt a definition of impeachment from eighteenth century
British cases such as that of Warren Hastings (see id. at 3) seems hardly illuminating in
view of the essentially different purpose to be served by article I, section 3, clause 7. Moreover, Professor Berger's treatment of the Pickering and Chase impeachments, id. at 183-85,
224-51, which largely disregards the relationship of those proceedings to the election of
1800, the repeal of the Circuit Court Act of 1801, the postponement of the Court's term in
1802, and Marbury v. Madison, is unrealistic. As Professor Bestor demonstrates, the
framers of the Constitution frequently used familiar language from *British public law. See
Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Intent of the Constitution Historically Examined, 5 S-roN HALL L. REv. 527, 565-67 (1974). The language of
the impeachment clause reflects this tendency. However, the meaning of the familiar
vocabulary can only be discerned in light of a very different distribution of powers. British
precedents are irrelevant, and the thirteen American precedents (see note 215 infra), are
inconclusive. The two great trials of Chase and Johnson can only be understood as efforts
to achieve a major alteration in the distribution of powers of the central government. Both
attempts failed.
212 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
213 US. CoNsr. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 states in relevant part:
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.
214 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 provides in pertinent part:
Each House shall be the Judge of the . . . Qualifications of its own Members ....

215 Only four individuals were ultimately convicted. One convicted man, Judge
Pickering, was presumptively insane and in no position to pursue a judicial remedy. Only
one of the other three sought judicial review. See note 221 infra. For a historical analysis
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In Powell, a mandamus judgment could easily have been ignored
by the House of Representatives, but such an action would not have
legitimized Powell's exclusion before the nation at large. If a congressional impeachment such as that of Pickering were subjected to judicial
review, disapproval of the grounds for impeachment would not of itself
gain restoration of office for the ousted judge, since the Court could not
draw his salary checks. However, such a decree would deprive an impeachment conviction of any claim to legitimacy and would justify
executive support for the judiciary. The implications of that thought in
the context of an executive impeachment are far-reaching. Considering
the ingenuity of the Court from Marbury v. Madison to Powell in devising methods by which legislative or executive excesses of power
could be deprived of legitimacy, it seems unlikely that any technical or
jurisdictional obstacles would be permitted to obstruct judicial review
of an impeachment. The possibility of judicial review should be carefully considered by Congress before it accepts any overly expansive
definition of impeachable offenses. At stake, ultimately, may be the
claim to legitimacy of the entire national government.
If, for example, the House should impeach a President for impoundment of funds and the Supreme Court grant certiorari in one of
the numerous impoundment cases pending in various federal district
and circuit courts, 216 the possibility of a dangerously ambiguous outcome in any impeachment proceeding would be patent. Would the
Court concede to the Senate a power to revise its pronouncement that
the impoundment in question was a valid exercise of presidential discretion? Would it concur if the Senate voted that the President had no
discretion in determining how "the Laws [were to] be faithfully executed" 211 while it concluded that such discretion was an essential and
intended check upon legislative power?21 8 If the Court accepts the
and general discussion of those individuals who were impeached, see Morgan, Eastman,
Gale & Areen, Impeachment: An Historical Overview, 5 SEToN HALL L. REv. 689 (1974).
216 E.g. City of New York v. Train, 6 E.R.C. 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 42
U.S.L.W. 3610 (U.S. April 29, 1974). See Rodino, Congressional Review of Executive Action,
5 SErON HALL L. REV. 489, 512-13 (1974).
217 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
218 Cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). In this case, the Court considered
the validity of an Act of Congress designed to enforce a treaty between the United States
and Great Britain concerning migratory birds. The state of Missouri alleged that the
enactment violated its constitutional right to regulate its game. Justice Holmes observed
that
[ain earlier act of Congress that attempted by itself and not in pursuance of a
treaty to regulate the killing of migratory birds within the States had been held
bad ....
Id. at 432. The fundamental question in the present case was whether the treaty effec-
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thesis that all the powers of the national government, including those
of the legislature, are intentionally subject to concurrence of a second
branch in their exercise, such presidential, discretion is a possible conclusion. If the Court ever reaches that conclusion, a procedural device
for depriving an impeachment of the claim to legitimacy almost certainly will be devised. Moreover, should the judgment of the Senate
differ from that of the Court, we may wonder whether the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the commanders of fifty state militias would act upon
Richard Nixon's claim to legitimacy or upon that of Gerald Fordor would act unanimously.
Whether Powell was intended as a suggestion to Congress that
the judicial branch had the power to cast doubt upon the legitimacy of
any congressional action, even though it could not enforce a decree,
remains a secret in the bosom of the Supreme Court. But it should not
be forgotten that 1968 represented a period when, not unlike Jefferson's time and Johnson's time, the Court was under extraordinary
pressure from the executive and legislative branches, particularly because of its liberalization of criminal procedure. 19 The same sort of
impeachment talk as that disseminated by the Jeffersonians against
Samuel Chase and by the Radical Republicans against Salmon Chase
was prevalent during this period. Possibly Raoul Berger reads the
subtleties of the Powell opinion prophetically. We must not lose sight
of the fact, that while today Congress is discussing the removal of the
President, as recently as 1970, it was discussing the removal of Justice
Douglas. 220 The life-tenured judges of article III have taken a longer
view than either of the elective branches throughout the history of the
Republic. Perhaps they were taking a longer view in Powell. If the
Court were to approve a definition of impeachable offenses that was
devised by the House, and to affirm a Senate conviction of the President,
his removal from office would have an undisputable legitimacy for
both the contemporary world and history. Not so, however, if the Court
should disapprove. That judicial review might cast doubt upon the
legitimacy of title to the office of the President is a sobering thought.
Yet, the thought that two-thirds of the Senate could remove an article
tively legitimatized a course of action which Congress, alone, arguably could not have
constitutionally pursued. Justice Holmes responded in the affirmative:
It is obvious that there miy be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national
well being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed
by such an act could ....
Id. at 433.
219 See generally F. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND (1970).
220 See H.R. Res. 920, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
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III judge because it disagreed with a decision he rendered-and that the
judicial and executive branches would be powerless to question such an
exercise of legislative power-is equally sobering. The necessity for
executive enforcement of its decrees imposes self-restraint upon the
Court. The possibility of judicial review of an impeachment should
impose self-restraint upon Congress. There are no Supreme Court
precedents which exclude the possibility, 21 and the evolutionary
exegesis of the Constitution certainly has not ended.
Of course Congress could, as it did in 1802 and 1868, attempt to
insulate its exercise of power from judicial review in the article III
courts by removing judicial review of an impeachment from the jurisdiction of any federal court. But the political atmosphere in 1974 is not
at all comparable to that in 1802 or 1868. Despite "the self-inflicted
wound" 222 of the criminal justice cases, the Court has an enormous
reservoir both of good will and of belief in the morality of its claim to
be the necessary arbiter of legitimacy. One doubts if the same can be
said about either the executive or the legislative branch. Any effort to
prevent judicial review would surely deprive an impeachment of any
authority as a legitimate exercise of power. 223 What might emerge .from
the resulting chaos could be a national government of a quite different
character.
The two greatest threats to the separation of powers compromise of
1787 occurred in Jefferson's administration and in the Reconstruction
era. 224 In 1805, six wise Senators defected from their party and pre221 The dismissal of Judge Ritter's petition for review of his impeachment conviction
is not a definitive adjudication of this issue. Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 293 (1936),
cert. denied, 300 U.S. 668 (1937).
222 See note 219 supra.
223 Mississippi v. Johnson contains enigmatic language which may, considering the
time it was written, have been intended by Chief Justice Salmon Chase as a hint to
Congress that a conviction in an impeachment was judicially reviewable. The Chief
Justice stated:
The Congress is the legislative department of the government; the President
is the executive department. Neither can be restrained in its action by the judicial
department; though the acts of both, when performed, are, in proper cases,
subject to its cognizance.

... And in that case could this court interfere, in behalf of the President,
thus endangered by compliance with its mandate, and restrain by injunction
the Senate of the United States from sitting as a court of impeachment? Would
the strange spectacle be offered to the public world of an attempt by this court
to arrest proceedings in that court?
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 500, 501 (emphasis added). One wonders whether the intended message
was that the trial of an impeachment would not be enjoined but could in a proper case
be reviewed.
224 Some may perceive a similar threat in President Roosevelt's court-packing bill and
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vented Jefferson from deposing the Supreme Court. 2 5 Had they not so
acted, it seems likely that we would have had a national government
operating on the majoritarian principles Jefferson advocated. By
settling the Yerger case in 1869, a sagacious Attorney General Charles
Hoar prevented a confrontation between the Court and a Congress
supported by a sympathetic President, thereby defusing the second
great threat to the 1787 compromise. Today, the conflict over dispersal
of decisional responsibility and interdependency in the exercise of
power rages between Congress and the President. Although manifested
primarily by congressional attention to executive department wrongdoing in the Watergate matters, contemporary tension between Congress and the executive may be seen by historians as an effort by
Congress to reassert some of the decisional responsibility which it
abdicated in recent times to the Presidency. Hence, congressional action
may be viewed as a counterattack directed more toward the Presidency
than the President. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution is a prime example of
abdication to the President of ongoing responsibility for making war.
That abdication put the system out of balance, and eventually deprived
the Viet Nam War of the claim of legitimacy which true sharing of
decisional responsibility would have afforded. It became an executive
department war which came to an end when the citizenry declined to
acknowledge its legitimacy. Indeed, a proper sharing of decisional
responsibility probably would have ended this fiasco years sooner. Now
viewing the cost of its prior abdication, Congress is fighting to regain
its legitimate role. But while appreciating that its failure to exercise
independent judgment in the interdependent exercise of national
power is as much a danger to separation of powers as excessive claims
by any branch, Congress should not overreact. The danger to the basic
framework of the federal government from excessive claims of power
in either branch is no less real today than in 1805 or 1869. Will wise
men appear in either branch in our generation? Perhaps separation of
powers in the sense in which I perceive it has outlived its usefulness as
a method of governing this Republic. Since this method has served us
better than other methods tried elsewhere, I hope not.
the possibly related impeachment of Judge Ritter. Whether, as sometimes suggested, it was
the political acuity of Chief Justice Hughes that saved the day or, as seems more likely,
that the President never had sufficient votes in Congress, the 1937 threat never approached
the same degree of gravity as those of 1805 and 1868.
225 See note 69 supra and accompanying text.

